



WOODS: You would think that a bombshell like this – I guess it's not really a bombshell in that we all kind of knew it, but it is a bombshell by establishment standards – certainly that there'd be a lot more outrage. And it's like no one even cares. Like we all sort of knew that this had to be what was going on. And of course, the impeachment is going on, and I suppose that's taking people's attention away. But I think that's just the mainstream. They just don't care. That's my impression. They just don't care. Am I wrong? Has there been a huge tidal wave of outrage that I missed? And I'm not even saying that sarcastically. Maybe there was.

HORTON: Well, I don't watch TV news, honestly. But no, I mean, I think impeachment itself did a lot to drown this out. I read a quote in *The Hill* where a guy said that the Pentagon Papers back in the Vietnam War landed on essentially a tinderbox soaked with gasoline that went up in flames. In this case, it's like a match landed on some wet grass.

WOODS: Yeah.

HORTON: But there's a piece in *The Hill* too about why the silence, and the answer is because it doesn't fit anyone's part of the narrative. It's half Bush's fault, and it's half Obama's fault, and you know, one-eighth Trump's or something.

WOODS: Right, so it's very hard to find people who really despise the entire regime like you and me.

HORTON: There you go, and so everything has got to be a partisan fight. And *Can you believe what some stupid person said?* is so easy to do to compared to really learning and knowing about a thing and being upset about that. And you can always find *Some idiot said some outrageous thing* to cite and talk about, and so that's where everybody tends to go all the time, of course. But you'd have to say something homophobic about the war in Afghanistan to get anybody to notice, I guess.

WOODS: To get anybody to care. I know, it's ridiculous. Yeah, death is not enough for these people. It's just ridiculous. All right, start off by telling us the nature of what this dump of documents basically is. What exactly did the *Washington Post* accomplish here?

HORTON: Okay, so there's an organization called SIGAR, which is the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. And I think he doesn't even work for State or DoD; I think he's just like the roving Inspector General for the Afghan war. And it's the same guy, John Sopko, for many years in a row now, and he's done a really great job on a lot of things. And this was a lessons-learned project where they went and interviewed like 400 people who'd been involved in the war, State Department and DoD mostly. And so this is sort of their after action report about, jeez, how come things didn't work out so well?

And the era is about 2015, 2016 on the interviews here. And there's a little bit of finger pointing, but mostly because they're being interviewed and the idea is no one's ever going to know their names, this part isn't going to be published – you know, other government people might see it, but the public won't see it, was the idea behind it. And so they're somewhat frank about it. And it's just interviews. There's hundreds of them, and I've gone through a couple of dozen so far. And there's already been a bunch of stories written about what's in there.

But essentially what it is, is it's the leaders of the war, including people like Douglas Lute, who is at the very top or in the White House, a general, the war tsar, or somebody like Ryan Crocker, who was the ambassador under Obama, and Mike Flynn, of course, famously McCrystal's right-hand man during the Obama surge and then later Trump's first National Security Advisor before he was pretty much entrapped by the FBI and run out of office. And essentially, it's them admitting that the whole project is a big, stupid project. I mean, Tom, honestly, if I said to you, imagine a bunch of interviews with a bunch of American government employees trying to explain why their project to remake the nation of Afghanistan didn't quite work out, this is pretty much exactly what you would imagine.

If anything, I'm disappointed that nobody seems very mean or nefarious or premeditated in their malevolence here. They're just exactly the kind of ridiculous boobs that you would think that they are. Ryan Crocker, at the end of his whole thing, he's going on and on about how all we did was build up all this corruption and empower these horrible, murderous warlords, how the army and the police we trained up are terrible criminals when they show up at all. And then he ends, I swear, here's the quote, he says – he's talking to the Inspector General staff here. He says, "You're doing important work, and I hope to God it will inform the next set of nation-building experiences." And so there you go. Just the lessons learned here are that we need to be a little bit more careful and tinker around the edges of our plans a little bit the next time.

WOODS: But see, now that raises another question, because it seems as if we're also detecting in this dump of material there was general confusion among a lot of people as to really what the goal was. What exactly are they trying to accomplish there? Is it A, B, or C? Is it A, B, and C? So what are the different things they claimed that they were doing, and half the time they claimed they weren't doing but they obviously were?

HORTON: Right, well, so the project is make a strong central democratic government for the country of Afghanistan. That's the project. And then so that includes pacification of any insurgent resistance. It includes trying to build up governors to be the strong rulers of the several states essentially, in the Afghan union, in the provincial capitals there. And try to build up an army, to build up a police force, different police forces. To create a parliamentary system. To build an economy, a 21st-century economy, dams and hydroelectric plants and hospitals and schools for little girls, Lord knows. And everything, Tom. Everything.

And so as some of them complain in here, yeah, I mean, part of it was they had so many missions, they had no mission. There was no key strategy underlying anything. Essentially, it's just make work for government employees. And you have as many different departments as possible. You have all kinds of people from the Department of Agriculture who are coming and saying, *Oh, we're going to teach you how to grow turmeric* – or whatever, I don't know the names of spices. You know, we're going to redo everything. And then so, of course, nothing gets done at all.

And meanwhile, the primary task, of course, is just basic security, which means in their eyes, creating a monopoly, centralized power out of the capital city of Kabul, which was just impossible. And as I explained in the book, essentially what's happened – and this is a vast oversimplification, but it's still true, essentially – is we have a coalition of 20% minorities, the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Hazaras. And they have this Northern Alliance coalition that we support in the capital city, and they are fighting an insurgency by 40% of the population. The plurality population are Pashtuns. And mostly their only political leadership are the Taliban.

Whatever Pashtun politicians have ingratiated themselves inside the government doesn't translate into Pashtun representation in the government in any way. It just means that worse warlords closer to home now have even more power because they've made an agreement with Kabul for guns and money and more power. And so they're just tyrannized. And so it's not that the Taliban represent justice necessarily, but at least they're not puppets of foreign powers. Well, actually, sort of Pakistan. But essentially, they are indigenous power helping the people

resist a foreign occupation and a sort of foreign government being foisted on them from the north of the country.

And in Iraq War II, Tom, America took the side of the 60% Shiite Arab supermajority in alliance with the 20% Kurds against the Sunni Arabs, essentially. So that was horrible and bloody, but at the end of the day it worked, and America succeeded in installing Iran's friends in power and getting kicked right out of the country. But they did help the supermajority win the civil war. It was the supermajority. Here, we're fighting for a coalition of minorities against the plurality, so it's just not working. It hasn't worked this whole time.

And also, look. People, when they say *geopolitics*, it sounds like some goofball just trying to sound smart, right? Like, what does that just mean, international politics? It took me forever to finally figure this out. It actually means geography politics. In other words, it really matters which way the pipeline goes, which way the river flows, who has access to which port, and this kind of thing, has a lot to do with the politics. And that's what that really means.

So you have the geopolitics of American forces in Central Asia as supposedly some bogus balance against Russia, China, Iran, etc., which is a joke anyway. But you also just think of the geopolitics of Afghanistan itself. It's a country the size of Texas, which if you've ever been to Texas or flown over Texas or anything, you understand there's a reason it was its own sovereign republic there for a while. It's the size of Texas. It's completely landlocked. It's a couple hundred miles from the Indian Ocean, but it's landlocked behind a mountain range. You have to go all the way up to the Khyber Pass to get your trucks down into Afghanistan. And it's got deserts like California and mountains like Colorado and a population that likes to fight and has rifles.

Anyone could have told you, aka *me*. I could have told you. I did. In September of 2001, October of 2001. This is never going to work. Trying to take over this country, remake this country, install a new government, defeat the tribal – you know, pacify the local population there. You're crazy to try. Look what happened to the Russians. That's the real lesson here, is that bin Laden learned the lesson with the help of the Americans in the 1980s. If you just get a superpower to invade Afghanistan, they will bankrupt themselves and destroy themselves trying to pacify this wild land. It was a smart plan. When Walter Slocombe and Zbigniew Brzezinski said let's bait the Soviets into invading Afghanistan, we'll give them their own Vietnam, it made perfect sense. And it worked.

Bin Laden said we'll do the same thing to you, and gave Bush the opportunity to exploit – I'm not saying Bush was an innocent victim in this. He was given a crisis to exploit, and he fell for it exactly the same way that the Soviets did, and has driven his country into the ground. And of course, if Afghanistan was bin Laden's magic wish come true, then what does that mean for all the rest of the regime change wars across the Middle East? But that's another day.

WOODS: Well, of course, one of these small goals is to build up some kind of an Afghan security force, police and army, that'll be able to sustain itself when Americans leave. And surely, this is also a reason for people drawing a Vietnam comparison, because supposedly, that was what Nixon was trying to do, was to Vietnamize the conflict. And it looks like that also, to say the least, did not make a whole lot of progress. You read the testimonies of some of these Americans about what they thought of the Afghan police force, for example, it's not particularly flattering. And so the whole thing, then, winds up being a matter of manipulating the metrics. And when you read this thing, when you read testimonials of people saying we tried everything, we tried violence levels, we tried – they just listed all the possible ways in which progress might be made. And they just could not get the numbers to work, somehow. But yet still, they were able to somehow take this dog's breakfast and manipulate it in such a way that it seemed somehow not quite as hopeless as it really was.

HORTON: Yeah, well, it's a funny thing, because that kind of propaganda, it's just like in the book *1984*. We're all the worst propagandists for the members of the party. All the regular

people out there, they don't know or care much, and if they see through the lies, it doesn't matter much. But to the people with the power, they're the ones who have to believe, and so that's where you see like in the Obama years, this fad of counterinsurgency. And it was just like any other ridiculous fad that happens in society over a pop star or some TV show everybody's watching together or something like this. We get all caught up in this idea. *Oh, yeah, now we're going to do this big counterinsurgency. And David Petraeus knows what to do.*

Of course, at the heart of it is building up this army. Except you're talking about this extremely poor country where the literacy rate is just completely in the dumps, where people join the army to get a rifle and a pair of shoes and then they leave, and they might come back for another rifle and another pair of shoes. There's no way to keep them there. And where the whole system is so corrupt the way the cash is paid out, that the commanders all have an interest in pretending that all of their AWOL soldiers are still there because they get to cash all their checks and keep all the money themselves. So you have entire divisions of ghost soldiers that never existed. You have years' worth of effort of training up an army that barely shows up, and then when they do, they don't really have the support or the capability. And oftentimes, they get completely overmatched and killed by the Taliban, who seem to just set off a truck bomb out in front of a base, ten guys go in, kill everybody and leave. Happens all the time.

You know what happened in Pensacola last week – which first of all, was blowback. I wrote an article about this at Antiwar.com, where I transcribed the guy's entire statement. It was nothing to do with religious extremism and everything to do with political extremism. But that, yeah, it was a terrorist attack, but also you could call it, it was a green-on-blue attack. It was what they call an insider attack, where the guys that we train turn around and stab our trainers in the back. Our Marines that fight in Helmand Province right now, they have guardian angel snipers on towers all throughout their base, because they're afraid that the men that they're training might turn around and kill them at any moment. So they have to have snipers on 24-hour patrol, guarding the trainers, protecting the trainers from the people they're training. And this happens not just to – you know, Americans have been killed. Many Americans have been killed in these insider attacks, but the Afghan army is incredibly susceptible to them.

And this just happened two days ago. Insider attack kills 25. *New York Times* had a great thing about it. This is propaganda, Voice of America, but same difference, though. It's true. And what happened was, either he was a Taliban infiltrator in the first place or he was just some guy who took the opportunity. We don't really know. But he probably was recruited by the Taliban to do it. Went in there, joined the army, ingratiated himself long enough to win everybody's trust, and then when everyone was asleep in the middle of the night, he took an AK-47 and he massacred at least 25 of them. They claimed as many as 32. Then he took all the guns and all the ammo from the base and took off with them and gave it all over to the Taliban. This is the army that America has built up there. There's no reason for these people to be loyal to it. The only reason they're showing up at all is a paycheck, and it's easy enough for the enemy to exploit.

And I want to emphasize; I say this in the book, too, that I don't think that everything would be fine if America leaves. I think we should leave anyway. But I think, essentially, there's no choice. And if we have the same conversation in 10 years or 20 years from now, the reality is, yeah, when we leave, the people whose power we've been propping up, it's due for a correction, and they're going to have a crash. When American paper money and Army troops are no longer propping up their corporate power, however you define it there, there's going to be a crash, there's going to be worse conflict. And there are a lot of real rock-and-a-hard-place decisions that have to be made by the Afghan government, the same ones that the Americans have been along with them in making hard choices.

For example, what do you do with all these warlords and former Taliban guys? On one hand, you could have made deals with them all along. They do talk about that in these papers, surprisingly, how – I don't know if they talked about Haqqani specifically. They talk about how much of the Taliban government surrendered and offered to negotiate and join the new government on its terms and that kind of thing. And America turned them all away, took them off to Guantanamo to be tortured or whatever, treated them as the enemy no matter what, even in their total acquiescence. But see, what's the opposite of that? Allow all these horrible war criminals to come and join in the government – like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who actually did make a peace deal a couple of years ago. So far, it seems to have worked out okay. And he brought in a large part of his militia, the Hezb-i-Islami, in from the cold and kind of joined the government there. But maybe he's just too old to be a genocidal dictator anymore, but that guy's got the blood of 100,000 innocent people on his hands from the civil war of the 1990s and has been pretty much an implacable enemy against the Americans up until two years ago in the war.

So there are real questions. So you have a guy like General Dostum, who was a communist, who worked for the Soviets in the '80s, and who was a war criminal, who murdered thousands of Afghans right under the nose of the American Green Berets, under the watchful eye, I should say, of the Green Berets in northern Afghanistan in 2001. I forgot where it was. But anyway, this guy's a horrible war criminal, and he's been the Vice President and has been the Defense Minister. And one of the warlords before him was a terrible communist warlord who was Vice President and Defense Minister before Dostum. But so then the question is: do you bring these guys into the government and try to channel their violence through compromise and through the government institutions, while giving them immunity for horrible crimes that they've committed? And is that really better, to channel their violence through the government, which after all, is capable mass violence? You know what I mean?

These are the kinds of decisions that the Americans must stop making, because each and every one of them, it's a deal with the devil either way. You prefer war to compromise with a bad guy? But the Afghans have to work this out without us. The Americans have proven that they're completely incapable of picking and choosing winners here. And look at the last election. They just had a bogus election that they're still fighting over right now. They had to create a whole new post constitutional ad hoc co-presidency system to keep Ghani and Abdullah from killing each other the last time, and they're already accusing each other stealing the election this time.

The thing's a disaster, Tom. I'm sorry to say that there's not a – as Bob Murphy could tell you about the crash in '08, there's not a soft landing here. You create a bunch of new money to try to pad the crash, all you're doing is creating the situation for further distortion and further disruption and dislocation and crashes down the line. It's the same thing here. We're 20 years into this now almost. It's the same thing.

WOODS: I got *the* question to ask you as a guy who wrote what we generally think of as *the* book on Afghanistan. Scott, as everybody knows, is the author of *Fool's Errand*, which is about the war in Afghanistan. And what I want to know is, you know more about the war in Afghanistan than basically anybody in America. I mean, the number of people who know more than you, it's like a rounding error. Basically nobody. So my question is: how much of what we learned from this *Washington Post* expose is just confirmation of what we already knew, was already sitting there in plain sight? Was there anything that you learned from this that was brand-new to you? Or is this stuff that, in a way, you kind of already anticipated in your book?

HORTON: Well, first of all, a lot of people know a lot more about Afghanistan than I do. I'm not a real expert.

WOODS: But I mean, imagine the percentage we're talking about, though, right? I mean, it's pretty small. That's my point.

HORTON: Okay, but I want to be fair to people who have been in the war, have been in one capacity or the other, real journalists who've risked their lives over there and stuff. I stayed home in Texas the whole time. All I was was right about it all along. But I don't speak the language, and I have not risked my life over there, and I did not go and do, like, firsthand, real journalism where I interviewed 100 Afghans myself and this kind of thing. The book is my best take on the war, and I'm glad that people have appreciated it. I'm glad that you appreciate it. But I want to make sure that – I don't want to claim that I'm a black belt in this stuff when I'm really not. I don't want it to sound like I'm pretending that I'm something that I'm not.

But as far as your real question here about what's in there, no. I mean, I have to say that what I learned from this story in *The Washington Post* essentially is I didn't miss anything. But essentially, it's all there. The corruption, the impossibility of the mission, and a lot of the different individual circumstances. Of course, as I read through, there are some small details. There was one point where I thought, *Oh, you know what? I don't think I ever really wrote about that warlord.* And then I read a little further and I went, *Oh, yeah, I did. That was the warlord that stole everything from the military hospital and let all those guys die of gangrene and all of that stuff, for the money. And oh, he was the defense minister. Yes.* Can you imagine if Donald Rumsfeld or Leon Panetta stole all the medicine from Walter Reed, and just sold it himself for his own greed? I mean, I know America is really corrupt, but our guys find more sophisticated ways of cashing in than just outright stealing antibiotics from the maimed and dying in the military hospital. These are the kinds of guys American put in power there. So, yeah, no, sad to say, Tom, that all I've seen so far is confirmation of what I told you all along.

WOODS: You know, Scott, also there were just so many isolated facts in here that are interesting. Like, for example, I'm reading this: "One unidentified contractor told government interviewers he was expected to dole out \$3 million daily for projects in a single Afghan district roughly the size of a US county. He once asked a visiting congressman whether this congressman himself could responsibly spend that kind of money back home. He said, 'Hell, no.' 'Well, sir, that's what you just obligated us to spend, and I'm doing it for communities that live in mud huts with no windows.'" So obviously the prospects for corruption are through the roof, even worse than usual.

HORTON: Yeah, there's one in there about a translator, and not a particularly good translator, who when he first started the job, said this colonel or this lieutenant colonel or captain or whoever, he needs a thing done, and how much to get that done? And the guy said \$200. And he said, \$20,000, the translator. And the American officer said, sure, no problem. Hands over \$20,000. And this guy pays the local Afghan the \$200 that he was charging, and he keeps the rest for himself. Well, he did this over and over again. He's now a banker and one of the very richest men in Afghanistan. That was where he made all his money, was just mistranslating and just pocketing all the cash at the CIA and the military were just shoveling at him.

WOODS: Oh, my gosh.

HORTON: He's one of the richest men in the country now.

WOODS: All right. That reminds me a Dave Smith's routine about the fake sign language translator from Nelson Mandela's funeral.

HORTON: [laughing] Yeah.

WOODS: All right, I want to ask you a couple of things somewhat unrelated to this. The first one has to do with our friend Jacob Hornberger, whom we like for the LP presidential nomination. And Scott, you have of course been an outspoken supporter of Hornberger, and really a supporter of his before he threw his hat into the ring. I mean, you and I have known of his work for a long time, and you've been close with him for a long time, and you've been

saying that he's a really outstanding representative of our point of view. So any, let's say, developments from the front?

HORTON: Well, I can tell you that he's having a great time doing this already. He's really working hard, traveling all around. I think he has one big project, is to try to win the primary in North Carolina, but he's got all kinds of irons in the fire. He's got a guy named Jake Porter, who he's hired to be his campaign manager, who I talked to for a little while and seems like he's just great and really knows his stuff, too.

And I've also heard, Tom, that your audience and Dave Smith's audience and my audience have been joining the Libertarian Party in huge numbers. It's more than 1,000, but that was a couple of weeks ago, and that was just a couple of weeks into this. So I know we brought in more than 1,000 people into the LP already. And so, one, I'm extremely grateful for that, and I will reiterate that you've got to do the work, everybody. Ron Paul revolution levels of dedication to do the work, to get the job as a delegate to the national convention. And the rules are different in the different states, but Michael Heist from the Mises Caucus can help you. He's on Facebook; he's easy to find. And whatever state you're in, he can tell you whatever rules you need to know, how to go to your state convention, how to get yourself and your wife and your best friend and your father-in-law all elected to be delegates to the national convention.

WOODS: Scott, let me interrupt you right there. What I'll do is Michael has actually written a couple of in-depth blog posts along the lines of: you've joined, what's the next step? And I will just link to those directly right on our show notes page. TomWoods.com/1557 is where people should go. All right, so go ahead.

HORTON: Yeah, and man, I just have to say I'm getting just pure positive feedback from everybody about this. Everybody's so excited. We've really wanted to have a Ron Paul revolution to participate in, and here we've got one. And one advantage that we have over Ron, even though we're not running for a major party nomination and getting that level of attention right off the bat in a way that he was able to do by whooping on Rudy Giuliani a little bit and stuff like that, we're going to be in the general all the way to the end, all the way to November. And there's such an opportunity to create a ruckus there on behalf of freedom and peace around here, and it's just going to be so great. It already is great. He's already creating a huge reaction and getting people really excited.

And so it's the holidays now, but right after the new year, we've got a huge mission till May to make sure he gets the nomination. And you know what I mean, Tom? It's like this: what if you were born a billionaire? Like, look at Michael Bloomberg spending all this money on TV ads and saying, *Look at me*. Nobody cares about him anyway. But look at the level of influence he's able to have on the debate just from being that rich. Well, this is like we're billionaires. This is our chance to have that much influence on the debate, where we can really move the margin in this country toward freedom with this massive public relations stunt, this massive speaking tour on behalf of peace and liberty, just like Ron Paul did. And I know it's going to work. It's already working. It's already great. It's going to be even greater. And please help, everyone. Let's do it.

WOODS: All right, so here's the deal here. A lot of people don't care about the LP one way or the other. The way I look at it is, as I've said, they have L in their name. They have the word *libertarian*. This is the exposure anybody's going to get to libertarianism, almost anybody, and this is what people are going to think of when they think of libertarianism. So if the LP is a train wreck, it reflects badly on all of us. And it's not that difficult for us to put this thing right, because when Scott says 1,000 of our people have already joined, you may think that's a drop in the bucket. Not for a party that has fewer than 15,000 members. No way. You get a couple more thousand and right off the bat, that means 20%, basically, of the membership comes directly from us, and a big chunk of the remaining 80% is highly sympathetic or would have joined through us if they'd had the chance.

HORTON: Right.

WOODS: So that's a big deal.

HORTON: And here, this is in a sense is some kind of weird outsider putsch, where all these people are joining the party and we're hoisting this guy on our shoulders and we're going to try to force him into the nomination slot. But it's Hornberger, who already is an old LP guy from back in the day, who has 1,000 friends in the LP all across the country already. Everybody loves Jacob Hornberger. Rockwell loves Hornberger and Cato loves Hornberger. Everybody loves him. There's nobody to fight about with Hornberger. He's everybody's friend and for good reason. He's a perfect libertarian on everything. And he writes every single day. You can read at FFF.org every single day. He's on it. This is a guy worth getting behind. This isn't like, *Good enough. I guess let's try it.* This is Jacob Hornberger, man.

WOODS: So what we've been doing, or at least my folks have been doing, is I have a link, because you can actually join the Libertarian Party through my link. And if you join through my link, you don't even have to include anything in the memo. And don't include anything belligerent, like *I'm joining to oust such-and-such* – you know, come on now, right? You don't have to include anything in the memo, because the fact that you're joining through my link says everything you want to say. That already says it. So as you would expect, it's TomWoods.com/LP.

So go there, join the Libertarian Party. It doesn't cost you very much. And let's do something with it. Let's do something with this thing instead of sitting on the sidelines saying, geez, they keep coming up with washed up Republicans. And here I'm more thinking Bob Barr than anybody else. If that makes you unhappy or you feel it reflects badly on you or embarrasses our cause, it's not that difficult given how small the thing is. And we're libertarians. We have just as much right as anybody else to want to influence the party. Let's do something about it. So TomWoods.com/LP, that's another link I'll put at TomWoods.com/1557.

One more thing before we go. We are nearing the end of the year, and Scott is – I always forget, Scott. Are you executive director? What is your title with the Libertarian Institute? Eventually, I'll get this. Eventually.

HORTON: Just director, man.

WOODS: You're just the director, okay. I don't know if I was giving you a promotion or a demotion with putting executive there, but you're the director of the Libertarian Institute. I'm going to give you – I'm going to hold you to this now – 60 seconds. What's your pitch to us?

HORTON: Well, it's me and Sheldon Richman and Pete Quinones and Kyle Anzalone and a couple others. We've got a great site full of great podcasts. We run awesome articles all the time, originals and also the best of stuff that we poach from Mises and other great places that you like. And we've published four books so far: *Fool's Errand*, my book; also *The Great Ron Paul*, my Ron Paul transcripts; Will Grigg's excellent *No Quarter: The Ravings of William Norman Grigg*; and Sheldon Richman's great *Coming to Palestine*. And we've got at least three or four more coming in the new year too that I'm really excited about. We're working really hard for freedom over there at LibertarianInstitute.org.

WOODS: Well, I'm a big fan of what you guys do. It's just tremendous. I love the diversity of sources that you're drawing material from. It really is great. You are carrying it out exactly the way I would expect Scott Horton to, finding the best and what's good in all the libertarians out there. And when I had Gene Epstein on last week for Gene Epstein Week – it's not just Scott Horton who gets his own week; also Gene Epstein had his own week. And he was saying that I have a very ecumenical podcast in the sense that I have people from the Mises Institute, that's true, but I really have had people from all over the spectrum come on and talk, because the people who are unfriendly to me, generally nobody's ever heard of any of them. The left-libertarians who have actually made a scholarly imprint actually kind of like me, so it actually works out very, very nicely. And that's exactly how you're running the

Libertarian Institute, is you're being ecumenical in the best possible way. That's really terrific.

So I'm going to link to you guys and if your campaign also at TomWoods.com/ 1557. So the lesson here is that it's urgent that you go to TomWoods.com/1557. I mean, everything that you would want to do is there, because we'll have the link to the *Washington Post* material, have a link to Scott's book, we'll have a link to the Libertarian Institute, and we'll have a link to TomWoods.com/LP, so that you can do what we're doing. Be part of the Horton-Smith-Woods campaign inside the Libertarian Party. All right, Scott, thanks again for your service, my friend. Talk to you soon.

HORTON: Thank you so much, Tom.