Episode 649: The Tyranny of Liberalism

Guest: James Kalb

WOODS: I'm so pleased to have you here. I was just talking to Chilton Williamson at a wedding recently, and he mentioned that he saw you from time to time, and I thought, Jim Kalb, this guy has no idea the role he played, even though I saw you only once a week during that time when you were running that dinner discussion group way on the other side of Manhattan, I had no one at Columbia who even remotely saw eye to eye with me, and just to be able to sit down and hash out ideas, even though it took me forever on the subway to get there, it was a real lifeline for me.

And now you've written these books that are — I read *The Tyranny of Liberalism* just in preparation for this, and I'll tell you, this book has just knocked my socks off, and it is one of very, very few books over the past 15 years that has really, really challenged things I believe and done so in a way that is respectful yet provocative and just relentless and elegantly stated. I can't say enough about the importance of this book. And you know, some of my listeners may read it and say I didn't agree with everything in it. Fine, but, you know, I don't want to live in an echo chamber my whole life, and I really, really benefitted from your book.

There's so much in it, though, I can't even attempt to do it justice by trying to summarize it, so we're just going to look at the first part of the book, because the first part of the book deals with the problem, deals with liberalism itself. The second part tries to deal with what do we do about it, what are the next steps. Let's think about that — let's just complain in this episode.

KALB: Okay, that's always fun, so let's do it.

WOODS: It is fun, right? There's nothing wrong with that when everything is this crazy. What I want to do is in a minute we'll get into your definition — but actually, you know what? How can we really proceed without that? Let's talk about what liberalism is as you are looking at it in this book, because you're not really confining yourself just to the left liberalism that we're familiar with. You are kind of suggesting a continuity between the classical liberalism of, say, John Locke and the left liberalism of John Dewey or Hillary Clinton or whatever. So start us there. You're trying to tell somebody from Mars what liberalism is all about. What do you tell them?

KALB: Well, really I'd say it's the whole of the current mainstream political outlook, so it really spans it from mainstream Republicans to mainstream and left wing Democrats. And yeah, the best definition I can think of is that it's the approach to politics that puts equal freedom first, that politics isn't really about facilitating or creating conditions for the good life with some idea of what the good life is, what it's oriented toward, but rather it's trying to facilitate people going for what they want themselves and being able to realize that, which sounds good, but it turns out if that's the approach you take it really can't work out as well as you think it's going to.

WOODS: Well, also, liberalism presents itself as just neutrality. It doesn't have substantive beliefs that it imposes on you; it's just neutral among beliefs and that what it's trying to encourage is a kind of social peace among people who have differing views. But the idea is that we shouldn't privilege any of these views; we should enforce a kind of neutrality among them, and liberalism is agnostic or silent about the actual content of these beliefs that people hold. Now, this is liberalism's conception of itself, and yet everything I just said about liberalism is a complete lie.

KALB: Well, yeah. What you've given is sort of the philosophical approach, the philosophical justification of it. You know, the facilitating people getting what they want is sort of the more popular and politics understanding, but they really come down to the same thing, because yeah, if you're neutral between plans of life, theories of the good, and also your natural approach if you're running a society that's to help people get what they want, or at least create the conditions in which that's most likely, and so the two very much go together.

And yeah, it runs into all sorts of problems, basically because freedom, it doesn't define itself. It has to be free to do something, because it's always going to be freedom against some possible obstacle or opposition, which includes the desires and plans and hopes of other people, so that in order to work it out into an actual system of government that decides things, it's going to have to decide among all those different desires and hopes and plans of life and come to some sort of conclusion as to which ones it's going to stand behind. So that's one aspect of the basic contradiction, that it's a scheme of governance that claims to be a scheme of liberation, and it's a plan of life that — it's a plan of social life that just by its nature claims to be neutral among plans of life. And that simply can't be, so something's being covered up.

WOODS: I'm glad you said that about basically liberalism as being something that ultimately is going to use force, because here it is claiming that all it's about is liberation, we're trying to liberate you from constraints. But yet, you can't look at the liberalism, certainly of the past 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 years — you can't look at that as a mere innocent bystander that is simply trying to help everybody to enjoy his liberties. This thing is ruthless and relentless in making sure that everybody that opposes it is despised, written out of society, is a bigot, his views — because if you are an opponent of liberalism you don't really have views. Your views can't possibly be worth anything. What we have are these universalisms, and what you have as the opponent of liberalism is nothing but backwards superstition and tradition and practices that are not, and ways of looking at the world that are not creditable to liberalism. And so

therefore, liberalism has to, instead of being an instrument of freedom, it has to run roughshod. It has to use brute force against its unenlightened opponents.

KALB: Yeah, it started off as something that's going to narrowly limit what government does, but then its idea of social power got expanded and ended up that some people even apart from government action have power that other people don't have. And so the desire to limit narrowly what government can do became a desire to limit narrowly what society can do, which means all of us. We have to be all closely supervised to make sure we don't step on each other's toes, to make sure we don't offend each other. And of course, by definition, if there are different legitimate views, we're going to offend each other, and then you have people offending each other, so you have to decide which one is the right view so that you can which one gets to say what he wants and which one has to shut up. And that's the way it works out.

WOODS: You know, in reading this book, I started marking passages. I started, I said, okay, I want to read this passage to the audience. And then the passage would go on (laughing). It would be page after page. So I thought, I give up. The whole book is a passage I want to read to the audience. There are so many points in it that I wanted to read and the way you state them. I guess part of the tyranny of liberalism is that liberals themselves view it as self-evident. They view it as something not really requiring a defense, because anybody who would oppose it is really not part of civil society, because you're not basing your thought on reason, because our views are all based on reason. And so one of your points is judges read liberalism into law, regardless of what the precedents have to say or what the texts of the law has to say, simply because liberalism to them just seems so obviously rational, they can't imagine anyone thinking in a different way.

KALB: Yeah, it just works out in a sort of very logical way, and I think it's exacerbated in the increasingly hierarchical nature of so many institutions. Like intellectual life, it's all been centralized in universities, and there's a hierarchy and prestige among universities. So what people think and how they talk about things just tends to become very much aligned with signals sent from the top, which aim at this perfectly friction-free system. It's friction-free, because everybody agrees on what you're allowed to think, everybody agrees on what kind of life it makes sense to live. And so therefore friction can't arise, and if you're doing something else that puts that in question, then obviously you're a problem and you're not cooperating with the sole possible system of reason. And therefore you're either crazy or evil or self-seeking or something bad, and you really have no right to put your views forward or act in accordance with them at all. It's a very strange result, but it does seem to follow from trying to make something as abstract as freedom the highest standard, because then that generates problems that can't be solved without some very arbitrary, humanly arbitrary method of decision, and that's what we've ended up with.

WOODS: But yet, it's not even like, at least the liberalism that in our lifetimes we've seen, has really given that much of a fair shot. It's not as if the liberalism is saying, well, everybody is free to behave and think the way he wants and everybody can be left alone and you can organize yourself into communities and neighborhoods where

you have certain understandings and you can live according to rules that are satisfactory to everybody. It's not that. It's that everybody's going to do what he wants, as long as it's in line with liberal rational values. If you're not doing those sorts of things, then we can badger and caricature you, and if you don't accept the choices that other people make we can make sure that your kids will be propagandized until they accept it. I mean, these are people who will not leave you alone, and yet the whole premise of liberalism was originally precisely to leave people alone. So why can't they? Why is it not enough to leave people alone, for the liberal?

KALB: Well, it's difficult. Once you say that the state is not the only center of power in society, once you say that, then you say, well, there's also wealth and there's also traditional arrangements like the patriarchal family and there's also recognized racial or ethnic hierarchies, once you say that, that informal arrangements are also centers of power, and so therefore they have to be restrained and realigned so that they don't oppress people, there's really no limit to what you're going to have to do to get people not to oppress each other, because all the things by which people have always lived — like religion or family or you belong to a particular ethnic group which has its own expectations — all those things turn out to be — I guess from the liberal standpoint they can't be allowed to affect anybody, and so therefore they have to be trained out of people. Everybody has to be supervised so they don't affect anything. And you know, it's open-ended and there's no limit to it. You know, the current cult of microaggressions is a sign of that. No matter how close to perfection they demand you get, there's always going to be something further.

WOODS: I want to run something by you. I want to run an idea by you and see what you think about it. This is the sort of thing that if I had thought of this 20 years ago, we would have been talking about it in the Village over dinner, but I really want to get your opinion on it. I come at this as somebody — you know, I have great affection for and sympathy for conservatism, and by that I don't mean Newt Gingrich and any of that. I mean real conservatism of the sort that's being discussed in your book. And I also do favor the market economy, and I have a lot of good reasons for favoring that, and I know that by and large you see the merits of that, and I understand the objections too.

But here's my concern. I read books like yours and I listen to arguments by people who have your point of view who are very much alarmed by what the modern liberal state is doing, and who also, though, are not altogether convinced by libertarianism either, because that's just another form of liberalism. But my concern is the following: in my view, what the Left wants to impose on society is totally artificial. It's artificial social arrangements or what have you. That's why you need constant propaganda and government enforcement and anti-discrimination law, because it's unnatural. If it weren't unnatural you wouldn't need to do that. If World War I had been popular, they wouldn't have needed to propagandize the whole country.

Whereas the way people naturally and spontaneously sort themselves — so, for instance, into traditional families or, let's say it, into ethnic neighborhoods — which there's nothing wrong with that. It's totally normal. It's how people live. Or into

religious communities. These are naturally, spontaneously occurring social institutions. So if I might call it a more right-wing way of living is just in line with these spontaneous ways that people tend to sort themselves. But the Left's goal is something totally unnatural, which is why they need the state to enforce it.

And when I hear traditionalists saying, well, if only the state were trying to defend Americans instead of undermine them and if only we could have a policy that would help out instead of undermining — the thing is conservatives are never going to win the battle for the state with the Left. They're never going to win that battle. The Left is much too well organized. The Left has to have the state, because its program can't work naturally. The Right's program is in my view socially natural. If you can just confine yourself to getting these people out and getting coercion out, people will naturally form themselves into organizations like this, and I think there's too much naiveté about, well, if only we could bend the state to our will. Post 1789? Not possible. That's my view. So my view is get the state as far out as possible, and I think that'd be my greatest likelihood of reproducing the kind of life I want to live. So what do you think of that?

KALB: Well, obviously you have to have a much less active state than what we have now. You can't have the state be this big bureaucracy as the medium through which people live and have a traditionalist kind of society. The problem is that a state always needs some highest principle, something that it's oriented toward, something it uses as a criterion. And if that criterion is freedom rather than the good life, meaning some conception of the good life, so that freedom becomes self-defining, then the idea of what freedom demands is constantly going to get broader and broader, and you're going to have a growing state, because there are more things in society generally that are going to come to seem tyrannical, like the family.

So yeah, a small state is necessary, and have the state get out of more things, and then people will respond to things much more in a natural way. That's the way they always have. But in order to do that, the state itself has to have some view of things that justifies that, that justifies letting people arrange themselves naturally and that says that natural arrangement is good. And you could have that, for example, in a Catholic kind of state, because Catholicism has natural law, and therefore people's tendencies as they naturally evolve basically make sense, although if they go off the rails there has to be some sort of limitation or correction and son on. But you need something, some idea of what the good is and why the natural ordering is good to get a state that's going to permit that to happen.

WOODS: Let me ask you this. What about left liberals who would say, criticize us all you want, but the fact is we have helped to do away with some very, very unpleasant forms of oppression. They might, as usual, point to the Civil Rights Movement as an example and say you can't throw out the baby with the bathwater; surely we've done some good, we modern liberals. How do you answer that?

KALB: Whatever good it could have done could have been done in more piecemeal sorts of ways, and if you look at the overall situation of black people, supposedly the

beneficiaries of the Civil Rights Movement, it hasn't gone that well. The social changes that align with the Civil Rights Movement have also led to the collapse of families, much higher crime rate, much higher incarceration rate, loss of positive leadership within the black community, and in fact, an ending to the economic progress that had been made for decades up until the early '70s. In the early '70s, economic progress of black people stopped. And so yeah, I mean, if you do something that's aimed at serious injustices, that's good, but if you do it by trying to transform society comprehensively, it's kind of doubtful that the results are only going to be beneficial, and I think that's what you see even in the case of civil rights.

WOODS: I'm sorry for jumping around, but you know how much there is in your book, and it raised so many questions with me. You're not the first to do this, but you're the most recent one I've read who's done it. You're connecting classical liberalism and modern liberalism, and that of course will offend some classical liberals today, who will say we have nothing whatsoever in common with Lyndon Johnson. You know, John Locke has nothing in common with Lyndon Johnson. We just want the various liberties that we associate with classical liberalism, including private property rights and a free market, commerce and contract and speech and press and whatever. And these modern liberals want to use force to do all kinds of crazy things, and that has nothing to do with an ideology that says that private property is sacrosanct. But on the other hand, modern liberalism did come from somewhere. So how do you posit a continuity? Where do you see a continuity between the older classical liberalism and the modern liberalism that has basically taken over the very name?

KALB: Well, John Locke, as you know, based his government on contract, and he says that, well, the contract is that we're all going to get together and protect property. And along with Thomas Hobbes, he sees man as basically self-interested; he's interested in advancing his security and material interests, and so that Locke thinks that the way he would do that, if you sort of got everybody together in some pre-political pre-incarnation in, I don't know, Never Never Land, is that they would agree on something like classical liberalism.

Now, John Rawls doesn't think that's what they would agree on. He says they would get together and agree that we should all have some liberties, but we should also have institutions that help all of us get what we want, and since we don't know how we're going to do in the struggle for getting what we want, we want those institutions to provide some insurance so that to whatever degree we fall behind the guys on top, that'll be to our benefit. And so you end up with a kind of semi-socialistic outcome from that same contractual approach, which fundamentally is the view that human beings are basically self-interested and they're self-interested in the sense of pursuing the material interests, so therefore in order to justify government to them, you have to think of it as a contract among that kind of people. So in the grand philosophical sense, that's where I see the continuity.

WOODS: Okay, but I could — okay, that's true; I could see that, but you know, think about a guy like me. I mean, I'm basically more Lockean than Locke. I don't go for the social contract stuff, but in terms of the justification for private property — if people

like me exist, then I almost feel like that disproves the idea that classical liberalism had to morph into modern liberalism. Well, no, it didn't, because I still believe in classical liberalism, and I don't see any particular reason that it has to — I mean, I understand there's a logic behind the idea that you could have some classical liberals who thought that trying to get rid of as much state privilege as possible would maybe minimize inequality, would maybe maximize people's opportunities. Then some of them said to themselves, you know what, maybe socialism would be more likely to maximize people's opportunities and minimize inequality, so let's jump over there. And that can happen if egalitarianism is your overriding value more so than liberty. But if liberty and the lack of coercion is your overriding value, then I don't see how that kind of tradition that privileges liberty has to morph into modern, managed, state-therapeutic liberalism. I don't see that it has to go that way.

KALB: Well, if you just start off with liberty as the ideal goal, how is it that property becomes sacred, because, after all, property is a vast scheme of limitations on what I'm allowed to do? And so what you have to say is that it really facilitates freedom, because if you have definite property rights, then, you know, if I acquire something I can keep it, I don't have to guard it all the time and I'm not at risk of the strongest thief, so things would go much better for me.

But of course, you know, a strict scheme of property rights is not the only possible set of social institutions, and that's what we've seen. The ideal of liberty started by getting rid of basically leftovers of feudalism, like these various special privileges and restraints on trade and limitations on going into various businesses, and so that had the effect of liberating property. But if the idea was simply to advance liberty, why shouldn't property rights also have to give way at some point? And that's what happened.

WOODS: I guess so, but then the question would be just an equivocation about what's meant by liberty, because then you just have a dispute about what's meant by liberty. Because of course, I can justify — I mean, you know, if we're going to argue that way, then the mere existence of human bodies is a constraint on others' liberty, because if I'm saying that you can't murder or rape me, then I think by the way you're arguing that would be some kind of imposition on your liberty, but that just means that we're defining liberty differently.

KALB: Okay, you have to have some way of making different goals people have consistent.

WOODS: Yeah, and property serves that purpose.

KALB: Okay, property serves that purpose, but so does a more elaborate scheme that gives welfare rights to some people and tells other people they can't call people harsh names and so on. There are lots of social schemes, all of them enforced by force, by government force, that prevent liberty from becoming self-defeating war against all. In fact, that's the way liberalism started. It started with Hobbes saying you have all these people wanting to get stuff, like a war of all against all, and the question has

always been, you know, what is the social arrangements which recognize that people are basically just out there trying to get stuff for themselves and that prevent conflicts and make it easiest for them to get stuff for themselves? And Hobbes said, you know, basically you're stuck with this absolute monarch who wants to keep things sort of orderly, and so he's going to keep us at least from murdering each other. And then you got Locke, who said, well, you know, it would be nice to have markets and property rights, because that way you get a lot more production. And after that, the more advanced liberals came along and added welfare rights and rights to —

WOODS: Okay, but why couldn't those be corruptors of liberalism? Why do we assume that they're more advanced versions of liberalism? I mean, conservatism was once a dignified thing, and today the — I was just reading an article by Lew Rockwell today. The conservatives of today make the '60s' hippies look like Edmund Burke, you know? There's been a corruption in everything. So why can't we say the earlier people were correct and the later people are just corruptors of something that was okay earlier? I'm sorry if I'm being dense, but that's what it seems to me.

KALB: Well, no, how do you get property to be sacred? That's one scheme to coordinate people's opposing plans so that they don't conflict violently. But you know, there are other schemes.

WOODS: Okay, all right, name me a scheme. Let's unpack an alternative scheme. And I'm saying this just as an interesting exercise. What would be an alternative scheme that would not violate the tenets of liberals? Is there one?

KALB: Okay, politically correct welfare capitalism, where you basically have a free market, and then the government comes in and collects a certain share of the profits as taxes to support people who don't seem to be doing too well in that free market and also tells people who seem to be stepping on others' toes because they have this position of superiority through various informal arrangements, like sex distinctions, that they can't do that. That would be another scheme, and it's the one that we see around us.

WOODS: Okay, it is another scheme, but are you saying there's no conceptual difference between — well, put it this way. Both of the schemes that we're describing, pure libertarian property rights, 100%, and the modern thing that we, as you say, live through now, it's true they both involve constraints imposed on others, in the sense that you can't just run into my yard and set off fireworks or something without consent, so that is a constraint on you, but also in the modern system there's a constraint on me in the sense that I can't keep all my income because it's going to be redistributed to favored groups. And so in both cases people are constrained, and so the systems are — there's not much to choose? I mean, how are they —

KALB: Obviously the reason — the stated reason or the reason can be stated — you say "favored groups." You know, I say, or rather the welfare state liberal says, well, we want to make people as free as possible, and you have tons of money, and so therefore taking 100 bucks from you won't interfere with your freedom very much,

whereas giving it to this guy who doesn't have anything will increase his freedom vastly, so therefore by doing that we're increasing freedom. That's a perfectly comprehensible argument if the big goal is to have people have as much freedom as possible.

WOODS: Okay, so they're just defining "freedom" as some raw ability to meet one's goals or to meet one's life aspirations or do what you want, and they take that as if I have more material wherewithal, I can more successfully achieve my goals. Is that —

KALB: Yeah, exactly, and if you have zero wherewithal then you're going to be thwarted at every turn. Yeah, and that seems like a legitimate way to go with self-defining freedom, which is what freedom is if it's made the highest standard.

WOODS: But of course, this does not minimize the possibility for conflict; it maximizes it, whereas a private property system, everybody can see the rules are universal, they apply to everybody, there are no special privileges. Whereas this system is just a matter of whoever gets the most political power can yank stuff from some people, but you may not have more political power than me tomorrow and I'll take stuff back from you. This doesn't minimize conflict, and one of liberalism's selling points was that it minimized conflict. The modern version quite clearly does not even aim to minimize conflict. It thrives on it.

KALB: Well, the European welfare states in fact have quite a bit less conflict than they did before they adopted those welfare systems. You know, in the 19th century, where you had a pure form of liberalism based on property, there was lots of class conflict, because people with no money said, you know, why don't we take stuff away from these people who do have money, so that in order to maintain the social contract it was necessary — and since there was no standard higher than the contract the decision was made that, well, let's take something from those who have a lot and give it to those who don't have very much, and that way we will maintain peace. So it wasn't simply a matter of giving money to politically favored groups, but rather a matter of maintaining a social contract that made everybody think that he had a stake in the system and was going to come out okay.

WOODS: What in your view — and I know I'm keeping you too long, and I'll try to wrap up, because I know you probably have to run. But what is fundamentally wrong with social contract approaches? I personally think, what I find that's wrong with them, it's not just that they're mere human contrivances; it's more than that. They're really bad and stupid human contrivances in almost every case. But in your view, it sounds to me as if you're saying that if all you had to go on is the consent of people in some mythical contractual arrangement, this is a very thin reed, and before you know it, the contract could suddenly say the opposite or the contract could suddenly say that redistribution of wealth is now our common agreement and there's nothing stable about that, and you can't have a society on that basis. Is that what you're saying?

KALB: Okay, what I really would like to say is that, well, in the first place, yeah, social contract's kind of a thin reed, because it's kind of a moving target, because it

becomes profitable to generate discontent, and that's been the history of radical politics. So it's a thin reed. You do find peace for a while, in fact, for quite a while it seems. I mean, Europe has had a long period of internal peace post-war. But in the long run, you just can't maintain it.

And the second point is that if it's a social contract system, if that's the idea, then you're not going to really be able to allow people to think whatever they want, because there's going to be government, and if government claims to be based on what the people think, then the government's going to care very much about what the people think, and as it gathers power through a more and more elaborate system that turns out to be necessary to maintain the social contract, it's also going to engineer consent.

And I guess a final point, which I suppose is the ultimate point, is that it's not sensible to have a government that's based on simply what people want. You really need one based on some idea of what the good life is. You just can't get along without that. You're going to end up with all sorts of irrationalities, because freedom is always freedom to do something, so if you put self-defining freedom at the top, it's going to wanter off in odd directions, which we see around us, so that in order for government authority to explain itself it really needs to be based on some consensus of what the good life is.

WOODS: Let me jump in. It seems to me that civil society can handle this. The community I live in, we could have our own conception of what the good life is. I don't have to look to a political figure to inform me of this. We can arrange our affairs according to our own conception of the good.

But then secondly — and then I'll let you go, I promise; I promise this is the last thing I'll say — is if liberalism prides itself on its universalism and on its lack of allegiance to any particularity, whether it's in religion or physical location or ethnicity or anything, it is pure universality — that's one of the great calling cards of liberalism. Then I don't see how it can say that a welfare state, ethnicity-redistribution style of government is just as acceptable from a liberal point of view as the old laissez faire, because I have not — you can say, well, in our society we have a social contract, and it says that we're going to help vulnerable people, and that means we're going to take some of your stuff and give it to them.

But that's a particularity, because you're saying that in this society, this will be the rule. But that's a particularity. There are human beings all over the world, and a lot of them are much poorer than we are in this country, so how can you justify as a liberal a rule that says the poor in this country are entitled to my money but the poor in Zimbabwe are not? Those people are just as human as you are. We're supposed to be universalists. So they would logically have to say that the people in Zimbabwe are even more deserving of my money than the people in this country are, and so given that there's almost no liberal in the world who would ever consent to that, then they violate their own universality by not consenting to it. The whole system collapses. They can't consistently hold to something like that, because if they did they would be

confining it to their own country, they would never agree to redistribution around the world, and the very fact that they refused to do that shows that their claims of universalism are a sham. So the whole thing is a nonstarter before it even gets going, whereas laissez faire is still standing.

KALB: Okay, on the universality. One thing that's important is that liberalism is reformist. That is to say it doesn't go immediately to the logical demand. So what you have is you have the European Union that perpetually expands. They want to take in Turkey now. You have the United Nations and other transnational bureaucracies that liberals want to give more and more responsibility to, more and more authority. It's a step-by-step thing. And you also have the current demand for free immigration, so to the extent that you can't send all this money to Zimbabwe, the Zimbabweans are going to have much more of an opportunity to move to Sweden.

But this is the source of liberal guilt. They have these universal commitments that clearly can't be realized instantly, and in fact, you and I both know they never will be realized. But nonetheless, they seem morally necessary, and so therefore they become reformist. You move toward them step by step, and this internationalism I think is clearly a feature of today's liberalism much more so than the past. As recently as 15 years ago, *The New York Times* was against amnesty for illegal immigrants. Today, unless you're more or less in favor of letting anybody who shows up and getting them a path to citizenship, you're a Nazi in the views of *The New York Times*. So you're right that there's this impractical universalism, and the answer is that, well, it's a step-by-step thing, and they feel guilty about it.

WOODS: Well, I'm going to let you run, but I'm going to keep thinking about these ideas and link people to your book, of course, at TomWoods.com/649. I'll link to your blog, to your Twitter, so people can tweet out 140-character responses to these difficult concepts here. But the book is *The Tyranny of Liberalism: Understanding and Overcoming Administered Freedom, Inquisitorial Tolerance, and Equality By Command*. That is a beautiful subtitle. Again, TomWoods.com/649, we'll have a convenient link to that. Jim, pleasure talking to you after 20 years, and thanks so much for your time today.

KALB: Yeah, it's been good, and I hope the audience has found this interesting and useful.

WOODS: That's what I'm shooting for with the show (laughing).

KALB: Yeah.

WOODS: All right, thanks again, Jim.

KALB: Okay, by now.