



Episode 650: Fascism: The Career of a Concept

Guest: Paul Gottfried

WOODS: We've spoken several times in the past, one time on the subject of fascism before your book came out, but now here it is, *Fascism: The Career of a Concept*. I'm holding it in my hand. I read it, and now I've got a whole fresh batch of questions for you about fascism. Why don't we start with — I mean, of course part of the book is dealing with different approaches to fascism, different definitions of fascism. What would be a definition of fascism? If you had to define it in terms of its identifying characteristics, what would be a definition that would satisfy you?

GOTTFRIED: Well, one that would satisfy me would have to begin by contextualizing the phenomenon that fascism is an interwar European movement that develops most fully in Latin Catholic countries, I think where it sort of acquires its particular contours. It is characterized by a struggle against the revolutionary left, in which the other side takes on a counterrevolutionary — takes on characteristics of the Left, some of the characteristics of the Left. For instance, it claims to be a revolution. It's a national rather than an international revolution. And it struggles against the Left in the name of the nation and its history. Against socialism it develops an idea of corporatism. It's almost a kind of neomedieval corporatism that, at least in theory, fascism takes over.

There also is, one might say, a kind of cult of violence, which of course also is taken from the Left, that the fascists can only come to power through some act of revolution. And they're typically contemptuous of parliamentary liberalism, which they see as a kind of weak force that cannot resist the revolutionary left. And they carry out their revolution in the name of the nation or the people, their historical people, so that one cannot begin to understand fascism unless one looks at it within the context that I discussed it in my book.

WOODS: So it's not enough to look around in the year 2016 and say, here, there are a lot of governments or there are a lot of U.S. presidential candidates who favor public-private partnerships and who favor various government interventions, and so therefore they're all basically fascists. That's not valid, in your view.

GOTTFRIED: No, not at all. To look at some kind of corporatist model of government or say that modern so-called liberal democracies stumbled into something that looks like a corporate arrangement or cooperative arrangement involving big government

and large corporations does not make a government a fascist government. Developing a welfare state does not do this. One of the definitions that I find the most ridiculous as the telltale sign of fascism is opposing immigration. I cannot think of too many fascist governments that even cared about immigration problems like that.

WOODS: And of course the other problem would be that would make 70% of the countries in the world today fascist.

GOTTFRIED: Right, right. The weirdest idea, and you hear this in neoconservatives, is that the Old Right is fascist because it's isolationist and averse to armies and averse to making war, and this makes them somehow fascist.

WOODS: Yeah, hello (laughing).

GOTTFRIED: Yeah, so that definition obviously doesn't work.

WOODS: All right, let's take maybe the classic case of fascism, and I don't mean Nazi Germany; I mean Italy.

GOTTFRIED: Right.

WOODS: Let's take the case of Italy. Walk us through and show how Italy, being the classic case, fits all these different categories and conforms to this definition.

GOTTFRIED: Yes, I think that the Italian fascists as a movement have to be distinguished from Italian fascism in government, and I think this distinction is typically made in understanding — as a movement, fascism in Italy sounds very revolutionary and it allies itself with nationalist revolution or nationalist socialists of some kind; that is, people who favor within the nation the development of a kind of socialist economy.

Once Mussolini takes power in 1922, he does very little to advance socialism, and this is a criticism that is typically made of him by social democrats. Many of them leave the country and go into exile and sort of set up shop in New York or Paris. What he does is create a kind of corporatist model of the state, in which large corporations, the working class, and the fascist bureaucracy all play some kind of role. There aren't too many, shall we say, socioeconomic changes that come about in the system, and a lot of fascism I tell people is aesthetic, iconographic. You look at, you know, fascist rhetoric; you look at fascist art, which is actually very innovative and interesting in the 1920s, and this tells you more about fascism than the economic changes. There are, you know, mottos which they have, like, "*Niente al di fuori dello Stato*," "Nothing outside the state"; "*Tutto nello Stato*," "Everything in the state."

But in fact, the Italian state really does not embrace very much under the fascists, at least not in the 1920s. In the 1930s, there is an acceleration of centralized power that occurs under Mussolini. Opposition to the one-party state that he creates is going to be treated in a more hostile fashion, although he does make an alliance with the Catholic

Church in the Lateran Pacts of 1929. By 1931, Catholic youth organizations are going to be treated unkindly in some cases by the fascist government, so there is an effort at creating a kind of unified state.

The most persistent characteristic of fascism is the glorification of something called the state, and the state is seen as a kind of living ideal, which incorporates an historic nation. It is not just a bureaucracy; it's not public administration. It's a mystical concept of the state. You know, the term "statolatry" that Mises and others probably would apply to the fascist state, that you know, everything — the state almost replaces God or that there's religion — everything is seen as sort of organized in the state.

Now, one of the points, though, that I make is that the Italian state in reality was not a particularly powerful state. They also stay out of wars until relatively late. I mean, it's not until the Ethiopian invasion in 1936 that they do any kind of major military operations, and then they are going to be drawn into the Axis, and they become pretty much a German satellite.

But one has to remember that from 1934 until 1936, the Italian fascist government led the resistance to Nazi Germany and supported Jews, let them come there. There was no anti-Semitism until the so-called racial laws in the fall of 1938, and a very large percentage of Italian Jews actually became fascist. The *Gran Concilio*, the Great Council of the Fascist State had Jewish members in it. So the fascists distanced themselves, the Italian fascists from Nazi anti-Semitism until very, very late, and even after 1938 there was nothing like the persecution of Jews that occurs in Nazi Germany, and that really doesn't begin until the Nazi German government occupies Italy in 1943 and sets up their own government in the north.

So one might say that fascism in practice is not a particularly successful form of government. It is interesting, as I argue, as an historical phenomenon that's sort of limited to a time and to a place, but you know, I suggest that were it not for anti-fascism, fascism in itself would not be considered a major historical force of the 20th century.

WOODS: Now, that's a very interesting statement, and of course not everybody you're talking about in your book would agree with that. Incidentally, the pen I was using to take notes has run out of ink, but thanks to having five kids, I have a brown crayon.

GOTTFRIED: (laughing) Okay.

WOODS: I have a brown crayon that's available; I'm going to use that (laughing). Anyway, I want to ask you, is it essential to our understanding of fascism and is it essential to the nature of fascism that it arose as a reaction against communism, or is that just a historical curiosity?

GOTTFRIED: Oh, no, no, no. That is — well, against revolutionary socialism, which may not have been necessarily communist at all times, although the most of the book

shows that they're only becoming communist. But I think that's an essential datum, and I think the Marxists have it right. In fact, I say that many times in my book. I mean, you cannot understand fascism without understanding it as a reaction to revolutionary socialism.

WOODS: So what's it reacting against? I mean, the fascists themselves, they're not certainly against private property or private property in the means of production —

GOTTFRIED: Not really.

WOODS: — but they would say that there has to be some kind of communal understanding of how private property ought to be used. It ought to be used for the good of the people, the good of the nation. So what is it that they are objecting to in communism?

GOTTFRIED: Well, they object to a number of things. One, they object to the internationalism of communism —

WOODS: Right.

GOTTFRIED: — because they claim to represent an historic nation and not some kind of abstract internationalism or an internationalism controlled by the commenter. So they're reacting to either real or fictitious internationalism as represented by the revolutionary left, and they claim they're speaking for an historic people and historic nation. And this, by the way, this attempt to become the counterpoint to the revolutionary internationalism is extremely appealing. I mean, the revisionist Zionists admire Mussolini. Marcus Garvey's Back-to-Africa movement celebrates Mussolini until he invades Ethiopia in '36. But you know, the interwar period, these ideas have tremendous resonance.

The other thing they don't like about them is that internationalist socialism claims to believe in the equality of everyone, whereas the fascists will argue because of their Roman and their Catholic past, they believe in hierarchy, that, you know, people are to see themselves as a kind of national army that is mobilized to fight the enemies of the nation. But within the Fascist Party, what they do is take over many of the command positions of the Roman Empire. They sort of go back to *Romanitas*, to the Roman tradition, which they're going to try to revive in creating their own Latin form of hierarchy. Now, this is not classical conservatism, as I argue, because classical conservatives are trying to preserve an existing social order. These people are engaged in creating the social order that represents the nation and is based on their notion of hierarchy.

WOODS: Did they fear that revolutionary socialism would amount in part of its program to an attack on the family? Or is that an anachronism?

GOTTFRIED: Yes, you do get that too, because as I said, there is an identification that occurs in 1929 with the Catholic Church, and they see themselves as defending all

organic groups against what they denounced as Protestant individualism, you know, and they stressed the identity of the church with *Romanitas*, with the Roman Empire, Roman identity. So they're very, very big on the Italian family.

WOODS: There's something I don't quite get about the Italian fascist program. If you're saying that everything they're doing is in the service of an Italian people that goes back into the distant past, there's something mythical about this Italian people, because if I had gone to Italy in the year 1000 or 1500, I would not have encountered an Italian people. I would have encountered a disparate group of peoples who had different dialects and traditions and customs, who didn't necessarily even like each other. So this is why I personally am somewhat drawn to the thesis that fascism at least has left-wing features. They're constructing something artificial instead of building on something organic.

GOTTFRIED: Right. No, no, this, by the way, I deal with in my discussion of Giovanni Gentile, the great Italian fascist philosopher, who is a progressive in the sense that he sees the nation as something that is only realized in the 19th century — which it was. People like Mazzini and other revolutionary nationalists, you know, Italy in the 19th century, he never denies this; it's just that he would say that the nation was somehow implicit or inherent in this collection of tribes that could finally become the Italian nation in the 19th century. But I think there is the awareness that you were sort of bringing together a nation, which is — it may be historic, but it only arrived on the scene in its present form, in the form in which they find it, maybe 70 or 80 years before the creation of the fascist movement. So they would not have denied what you were — at least at the philosophical level or the historical level. They would have recognized that the nation, a unified Italian nation, which comes out of disparate groups, arrives late on the scene.

WOODS: I wonder if there's — it's probably a stretch to make this comparison, but, "Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth" — you know, the idea that a new nation was being brought forth in 1776 is of course historically inaccurate, so then they have to appeal to, well, but the spirit of America was there, and we all were one people in some way, and it took a long time for it to be fully expressed. Agh, I just, ugh, can't stand any of that stuff.

GOTTFRIED: You know, what I could respond is that George Bancroft, who creates this myth, which Lincoln takes over, he sees America somehow implicit in the Pilgrims or there's the unified American nation state; he's Hegelian, and Gentile is the greatest Hegelian philosopher of his age, and both are heavily influenced by Hegel, who would say that at least the germs of the nation are there all along and it becomes sort of realized historically. So that would be the argument of Bancroft and of Gentile, that their nations, even though they did not formally exist until relatively late, were at least implicit in the founding of a people at a much earlier time.

WOODS: I have so much more I want to ask you. I definitely want to get to the anti-New Deal people, who compared FDR to the fascists and so on, but first let's pause for a message from our sponsor.

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All right, before I get to that anti-New Deal thing, clarify for the audience the difference between authoritarian and totalitarian, and then in which one of these categories would you say that a Mussolini falls?

GOTTFRIED: Yes, I would say that Mussolini falls into the weak authoritarian tradition. A totalitarian state, and I think this is already discussed quite accurately by Hannah Arendt, is a government which operates through terror or through constant intimidation and controls every aspect of the lives of its citizens. I would say that totalitarian governments are essentially leftist governments. The Left, I would argue, is by its very nature totalitarian. The Right is typically involved in a holding operation, which is usually not very effective, and the Right creates authoritarian governments. The Left, I think, is either explicitly or implicitly totalitarian.

And you know, Mussolini's government does not control everything in Italy. People did criticize it. People were allowed to leave. They come and they go. In the communist totalitarian model, your movement, where you lived, everything was controlled by the state. So I think in terms of the degree of control and the kind of control that you have in totalitarianism, it is a far cry from the authoritarian model.

WOODS: I was going to ask you about the Frankfurt School and its interpretation here, but I think I'm going to jump over to the U.S. example of the Old Right and people like John T. Flynn, who very famously drew parallels between Franklin Roosevelt and the Italian fascists. And he wasn't alone. There were others who did that. What do you make of that? Is there any plausibility to it? Is it just a stretch? Is it just a partisan attack? How do you as a scholar of fascism make sense of all that?

GOTTFRIED: Okay, well, I would say they were wrong in their judgment and they underestimated the importance of a social democratic political order, which would be the victor in the competition among successful political models in the 20th century. And at least sometimes, Flynn ends up sounding like Jonah Goldberg — but you know, pardon the comparison. But what I do argue is that he had reason to believe what he did at the time, since the Left, including New Dealers, like Rexford Tugwell, were profound admirers of Mussolini. I mean, they saw in the fascist state basically a kind of halfway house between communism and capitalism. And I think Flynn points that out.

WOODS: Yeah, and that's fair game, because he wrote about that, then John Diggins, many, many years later did a whole book on that.

GOTTFRIED: Right, right.

WOODS: You can see it in *The New Republic*. It is there.

GOTTFRIED: Definitely, it is there. I've written on this in other works as well, and there is a German work called *Entfernte Verwandtschaften*, like "distant relatives," and it looks at Roosevelt and Mussolini. But a lot of it in fact is based — I see it here.

Yeah, it's *Entfernte Verwandtschaft* — it's singular — by a man named Schivelbusch. It makes pretty much the same arguments as Diggins, but it also documents the pro-Mussolini statements that come out of the Roosevelt administration, particularly in the first term. So one can understand why Flynn would say that the American New Deal represents an American counterpart to Italian fascism.

WOODS: I want to zip ahead to the present day for a minute, because one of the reasons that all this matters is that the word "fascism" and the concept have been so abused over the years, and they've been put to the service of various ideological causes, different forms of anti-fascism. And even today, of course, people — I don't need to tell you this — casually throw the term around to refer to people who support traditional families or basically people who support things that basically everybody in the world supported in the 1920s, so there's nothing uniquely fascist about any of those things. So what I want to know is, when people today are using the word "fascism" and they're using it to refer to Donald Trump or whatever it is, so it's your view that that is absolutely indefensible, there is nothing to it, and it's just sheer stupidity?

GOTTFRIED: Um, I think it's based on stupidity, but I think it's also an opportunistic appeal to what is a hate term. And I think certain things lie together. I mean, if you say "fascist," it means "Hitler," although Hitler was probably more influenced by Stalin than by Mussolini. And "Hitler" means "Auschwitz," so as soon as you disagree with the prevailing leftist culture or if either of our political parties wants to call you a name, then you become a fascist, which means you support the extermination of millions of people in a concentration camp. Or that one thing leads to the other, could lead the Anti-Defamation League to discover that as soon as you deviate from some leftist orthodoxy, this could lead to something like Nazi extermination.

WOODS: Right, right. And speaking of the Nazis, I think with a discussion like this you do have to talk about them, even though we are inclined to think I think of Italy as the example to look at. But why is Italy the example to look at? Why is Germany not the norm? Why is Germany not the model for fascism?

GOTTFRIED: Well, the problem is, among scholars, Germany is the norm, even though Germany was not really a — I mean, it was only a very, what shall we say, sort of fascist by very distant association in terms of its political order. It looked much more like Stalin's Russia. But what happens is that Nazism is the most horrible form of what is considered fascism, so what you do is whenever you call somebody a fascist, you really mean a Nazi, and they're really referring Nazi extermination policies. Scholars, on the other hand, say that Italy is normative fascism or generic fascism. And if you look at fascist movements in places like France and Spain and elsewhere, it is the Italian model which they're looking at. It is not Nazi Germany.

And at the end of my book, I have a long chapter on Nazi Germany and what German political and cultural elites will not recognize; namely, that Nazism was a revolutionary phenomenon. It was a nihilistic, revolutionary phenomenon. It was different from generic fascism, and Hitler was not simply the successor of Kaiser

Wilhelm or Bismarck or the Holy Roman Emperor. He was a revolutionary in what he did. And he had no use for the Germany, the older Germany that he replaced. This is not something which Germans are allowed to be told anymore, because the official view is that their entire German past up until the American occupation was made up either of a Nazi state or something preparing them for Nazism.

The argument that I make, which is made by the historian Rainer Zitelmann is that Nazism really is a revolutionary. I mean, people made this argument, like Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn and others were right. And Hannah Arendt makes this argument. And one time in the 1950s, nobody had any problem making the argument that Nazism is a revolutionary movement in a way that fascism is not. You know, the argument that I'm making in my book is that Nazism is a kind of bogus revolutionary movement. It's an interesting hysterical phenomenon. It produces some interesting thinkers and interesting art, but it's not revolutionary. Nazism was revolutionary and very aggressive and imperialistic and very brutal.

WOODS: So is that the way we should think about the relationship between the Nazis and the concept of fascism? In other words, so okay, the Nazis have this aspect to their program that's absent from traditional fascism, but are they still a fascist state? Do they belong to the tradition?

GOTTFRIED: Yeah, the argument I make is that they're very eclectic or synthetic, you know, and things like concentration camps that become extermination camps, you can already see this in Soviet Russia, right? And you know, this has taken over. So the use of terror to control the population, this too comes from the Soviet model. This does not really exist in fascist Italy. It was not really a terror state. It was a one-party state, but it was not a terror state. So what I argue is that people like Nolte, who said that Nazism is simply a kind of intense fascism, they're wrong. Nazism is a very different phenomenon and more closely related in kind and its structure and its techniques to Stalin's Russia than to Mussolini's Italy.

WOODS: All right, then I can't help pushing this point a bit, because it came up the last time we talked about this. I raised the issue that you do talk about in the book; I raised the issue of Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn at his — and again, he's not alone in his claim that Hitler was basically a leftist and so on. In a way it depends on how you view legitimate power and revolution and so on, but forgetting these definitional issues, if Hitler draws more from Stalinism than from fascism, then why wouldn't you agree with Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn that Hitler's a creature of the Left? Or would you say that Hitler can't be pinned down because he's too eclectic?

GOTTFRIED: Right, because there are too many aspects of Nazism that do not fit the leftist norm.

WOODS: Okay.

GOTTFRIED: One of it is radically anti-egalitarian, and it shares that with traditional conservatism and with fascism. Whereas it is nationalist, it is not — I don't know if it's

nationalist. It's ethnic racist, whereas communism is internationalist and egalitarian. So in its ideology, it is not really like — I think come down on the side of someone like Zitelmann who says it is a *sui generis* revolutionary movement that one would have trouble fitting into either a leftist or a rightist category. And there's some things that are just, you know, *sui generis*, and I think the Nazis are that. They borrow from both, but they're not either a traditional leftist or rightist movement, though one can find aspects of both sides in the composition of their ideas and bullying technique.

WOODS: Okay. I mean, I have to admit, my initial attraction to his thesis was that I could then bash the Left over the head by casually including Hitler in my list of leftists —

GOTTFRIED: Right.

WOODS: — but you know, you can't (laughing) — you have to have a stronger reason than that to classify somebody. I think, even though we mentioned him a little bit in our last time, we've got to talk about Jonah Goldberg.

GOTTFRIED: Okay.

WOODS: I'm sorry, okay? And what I want to know is — because I actually got a little pushback on that. I had people say to me, I like the Jonah Goldberg book. What's the matter with it? And there are a bunch of things "the matter." One would be that he points to things that supposedly make liberals just like fascists, but these are things that have had bipartisan support for decades. But he just overlooks that. So he'd have to say, if he's going to make that argument, that everybody's been a fascist, all the presidents. His preferred party and the Democrats have all been fascists going back to the 1930s, and of course he won't say that. And then you bring up he was aghast when Rand Paul made an unkind comment about the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

GOTTFRIED: Exactly.

WOODS: Well, okay. Whatever you want to say about the 1964 Civil Rights Act, that is a leftist thing, and that is an egalitarian move. It's the sort of thing that — well, anyway, if he were a conservative he'd be against it, and so on. Also, he's upset because Rand Paul wanted to shut down the Department of Education or something. I mean, I can't make any sense out of — I can't get an ideology out of Jonah Goldberg. So what's the basic problem with his — I mean, what's wrong with that?

GOTTFRIED: Well, the basic problem is he doesn't know any history. He's a total ignoramus, from what I can see. He's a culturally illiterate ignoramus whose job it is to defend the Republican Party. And you know, as both of us have discovered, he beats up on the Democrats for things that have had bipartisan support for the past 50 or 80 years. He then takes Democrats who favored a much smaller government than the one Jonah Goldberg favors and calls them fascists. Something else he does in a book, which I think is just unconscionable, he takes things like affirmative action programs — which I think they are loathsome. I am totally opposed to them — and then compares

them to Hitler's treatment of the Jews or the Poles or something like that. This is ridiculous. The affirmative action programs are done in the name of left-wing political correctness and humanitarianism. That was not what motivated Hitler's policy toward the Jews. I mean, this is ridiculous.

WOODS: By the way, I should point out for people who just don't happen to know about it, Jonah Goldberg wrote a book called *Liberal Fascism*, and that's what we're talking about, and it sold extremely well. Extremely well. But the sales of a book are not always in direct proportion to the book's merits.

GOTTFRIED: Right.

WOODS: I hate to have to point that out. All right, so your book *Fascism: The Career of A Concept* really does walk us through the evolution of the idea of fascism as people looking back on it viewed it and how they thought about and how they theorized about it, where did it come from, what was its essential nature. Why does any of that matter? I'll just ask you the question that your seventh grade teacher would ask about your book report. Why is this important to us?

GOTTFRIED: Why does it matter? Because everything we're told about history are now leftist lies.

WOODS: Okay, that's important. Let's hear you justify that. I like that answer.

GOTTFRIED: No, I have another book coming out in a few months by the same publisher, called *Revisions and Dissents*, and I go through things like who was responsible for World War I, things like that. Things in which the Left continues to hold the high ground and lies to us. And there are many examples of this that I give; you know, things that you discuss in the *Politically Incorrect Guide to American History*. And it's just a matter of trying to clear the air a bit, because we're choking in this miasma of lies, leftist lies.

And at one time, you could read something like *National Review*, however bad it was in its apocalyptic anti-communism, and I agree with the late Murray Rothbard on this point, at least on historical questions they moved beyond leftist orthodoxy. You don't get this anymore. In the case of fascism, you have a lot of good scholarship on this. Unfortunately, the stuff that has been written at the scholarly level, particularly by my friend Stanley Payne, who's probably the world's leading authority on fascism, does not really affect popular consciousness or the media. And you know, we continue to hear the same lies repeated.

It was a point that our friend Hans Hermann Hoppe made, for which he was punished years ago, in which he pointed out that, however bad Nazi Germany was, it was not totalitarian to the same extent as Stalin's Russia. And it's perfectly correct. There was not the same degree of thought control under the Nazis. The economy was certainly not controlled. I mean, they may have killed people including my relatives, but it was not as totalitarian.

Well, I think Hans lost his position at a number of sort of libertarian or conservative libertarian magazines. They wouldn't let him write anymore, because this was so unacceptable. What he said would have been seconded in the American academy in the 1970s, but we have become so hysterically anti-fascist and in the worst sense anti-Nazi that you can't tell the truth anymore. And you know, I think at some level we have to start telling the truth again.

And in the case of the anti-fascism, I think it represents a dangerous, poisonous totalitarian force, which is a danger to our liberties. It is a far greater danger to our liberties than fascism ever was. That is why I try to expose the dangers of anti-fascism. I don't really write in any kind of moralizing fashion in the book, but I do show the extent to which anti-fascism has sort of poisoned the consciousness, particularly of Europeans. I think less so in America. And this does go back to the communist movement and to the cultural Marxists particularly, and I think it's very important to emphasize the danger of anti-fascism and to point out that anti-fascism is a greater threat to our liberties than fascism ever was, real fascism, generic fascism. So you know, that's why I think these problems are relevant.

WOODS: All right, I was going to let you go, but I have to probe a bit more here on this, because I can't just leave on that statement. Give me some specifics — I want you to defend that. Give me some specifics on how — and by anti-fascism, you mean this sort of hodgepodge of different people, basically on the Left, who condemn virtually everything they oppose as fascism. What are they doing that's such a threat to us? And I ask that rhetorically from my point of view, because I could answer that, but I really want to hear your answer.

GOTTFRIED: What is the threat of fascism or — ?

WOODS: What's the threat of anti-fascism? Why is that to be feared more? Because that is what you were just saying?

GOTTFRIED: Yeah, I mean, the threat is that in order to fight an enemy that hasn't existed for many, many years, which as I argue was never much of an enemy to start with, what they insist on doing is using resources, taking away our freedom, stepping on our freedom, controlling our speech, restricting what we're allowed to believe and what we're allowed to say so that this struggle can be pursued. And of course the fascist enemy keeps being identified with whatever an advancing totalitarian Left decides to oppose any given day of the week, so that at this point if you oppose transgendered bathrooms somewhere you are already on the slippery slope to fascism. Or in Europe, if an anti-immigration party wins in Austria, I've read that fascism is coming back to Central Europe. So I think anti-fascism is a continuing threat to our freedom, because every infringement on our liberty, every infringement on the will of nations or whatever majorities of countries decide, if it's not politically correct, will be attacked as a return to fascism. For this reason, I think it is very important that we recognize that anti-fascism, as I said before, is antithetical to liberty.

WOODS: Wow, that is an extremely provocative statement, but eminently defensible. The book is *Fascism: The Career of a Concept*, by Paul Gottfried. I'm linking to it at TomWoods.com/650, that's 6-5-0. Great talking to you, Paul. When's the next book coming out? It seems like you're churning them out, like, every three weeks.

GOTTFRIED: The next book I think will probably be out in the late summer, early fall.

WOODS: Ah, okay, okay. Well, then —

GOTTFRIED: I don't expect it be reviewed in *National Review* or *Weekly Standard*.

WOODS: Nor do I, but we'll certainly talk about it right here. Thanks a lot.

GOTTFRIED: Okay, thanks.