



Episode 668: An Economist's Case for a Noninterventionist Foreign Policy

Guest: David Henderson

WOODS: I almost titled this episode "Economists Are Good for Something After All," but then I thought that would be taken as an insult (laughing).

HENDERSON: I think that's correct (laughing).

WOODS: But you know, it's interesting to hear how an economist can take some ideas that are familiar within economics and apply them in other areas, and in this case, foreign policy. I want to start off actually not with the broad question of noninterventionism and where economic analysis can help us understand things better; I want to start with a specific topic that you wrote about some years ago, and that has to do with why it's not necessary to wage a war for oil. There have been of course cases where there have been wars waged that have been alleged to have been waged on behalf of oil and that indeed there may have been some of that motivation there, but you're saying this is completely misplaced. Now, why would that be? It seems like you'd need to fight a war for oil if you were amoral and you felt like the world's resources really belonged to you. You wage a war, and you get the oil.

HENDERSON: Right. So let me just back up by talking about a little U.S. history. One of the main reasons people think we have to fight a war for oil is that when OPEC raised the world price back in 1973 from \$3 a barrel to \$11 a barrel, we had gasoline lineups. People mistakenly blamed OPEC for that; they should have blamed Richard Nixon, because it was his price controls that kept the domestic price of gasoline from rising, so that we wouldn't have lineups. So no government anywhere in the world by cutting supply or raising price can cause us to lineup; only our government can do that. So that's the first point.

The second point, though, is could they do harm to us by cutting output. Yes, they could, but here's the thing: often where the governments – and I talk about governments because most of the oil produced outside of the United States, other than Canada, Britain, and so on, is produced by governments. A government can say we don't like the United States; we want to discriminate against the United States by not selling them oil anymore – but we want to keep selling oil. So what do they do? They don't want to cut output, so they sell less to us; they sell therefore more to someone else, so the people who they sell more to now aren't buying as much from their suppliers, so their suppliers sell to us. So it's kind of like a game of musical chairs

where the number of chairs equal the number of people. Which, by the way, if you ever played that at a party, the party would go on forever. It's a very boring game. But in international trade, boring is good. So that's the — there cannot be a selective embargo, in other words, that's effective.

So then how could a country hurt us in the oil supply? It would be by cutting the supply of oil. But here's the problem: they hurt us, they hurt every other consumer, and they help every other producer. Not every other consumer is their enemy. Not every other producer is their friend. So it's a very blunt instrument. So it just is very hard for them to do much harm to us. During the 1990s, in the run-up to the 1990 Gulf War, I wrote a piece in *The Wall Street Journal* that caused quite a splash, actually, saying this, and then doing an estimate of how badly Saddam Hussein could hurt us, and by taking extreme assumptions about the amount of oil he would control, the amount he would cut back, I concluded that he could cause a loss to our economy of a little under half a percent of gross domestic product.

WOODS: Okay, so but on the other hand, that's not a completely trivial figure, right?

HENDERSON: Right, correct. But did that justify going to war? When we think — put it in this perspective: the usual growth rate over the last 50 years has been about a growth rate of 3% of GDP — growth of GDP is 3% a year.

WOODS: Yeah, but not recently, though. They'd kill to have 3% these days — and so .5 would be one-sixth of it. I mean, I know neocons who would go to war over a cup of coffee.

HENDERSON: (laughing) Yeah, and I'm not going to persuade them, right?

WOODS: Right.

HENDERSON: But yeah, but the point is it's a very small number, and if you look at some of the things that our own government does to us, they often cause this half a percent of GDP. But I'm not making war on Capitol Hill, you know? In other words, our government does way more harm to us than any of those governments can do.

WOODS: Yeah, that I'll certainly grant. You know, you were mentioned in an episode of the show a couple of weeks ago, I guess. I had Mark Guttman on.

HENDERSON: Right.

WOODS: He had written a tremendous anthology called *Why Peace*, and you contributed to that, and I learned something about you that I hadn't known. I knew you were an economist, but I didn't know just how much of an impact 9/11 and its aftermath had had on your research program, and you began to think that maybe in addition to or maybe as a replacement for your discussion of domestic policy you would look to see if there was anything in your toolkit that you could bring to bear in

understanding foreign policy better. And I found that really interesting. Can you maybe reproduce those days for us of what was going through your mind?

HENDERSON: Sure, I'll tell you a story that is not in my piece in the Guttman book. By the way, I found out from a former student that he was interviewed on that show – a former student who listens to your show – and I loved your interview with him. I thought it was a fantastic interview.

WOODS: Thanks a lot.

HENDERSON: Yeah. But let me tell you a story I've not told in print – well, maybe in print, but I didn't tell it in that book. My book *The Joy of Freedom: An Economist's Odyssey* came out two weeks after 9/11, and a month before 9/11, the Cato Institute, you know they have these city events, they had an event in San Francisco, and I was invited to be the keynote speaker of the first speech up. And I talked about a lot of the themes in my book, but it was all domestic policy. I kind of took it as given that making war on Afghanistan was a bad idea. Some really bad guy does something really awful, you don't make war on the country where he happens to live. That was kind of my view. It turns out it wasn't many Americans' view, and particularly it wasn't P.J. O'Rourke's view. And so P.J. O'Rourke gave the luncheon speech, and he said he wanted to turn sand into glass, and I remember thinking, whoa, this has really gone way beyond what I expected. And in fact, I sent my first financial contribution ever in my life to AntiWar.com that afternoon.

WOODS: Wow.

HENDERSON: Yeah, yeah. And it just got me thinking about this stuff and I realized, you know, I do know this stuff. A friend of mine – you probably knew or you certainly knew of – named Roy Charles –

WOODS: Yeah.

HENDERSON: – had really influenced my thinking about foreign policy from about the time we became friends in the early '70s. But I wasn't in that area, and so bit by bit I was seeing how Hayek, his whole idea of decentralized information applied even more so to foreign policy than domestic policy, because the government has even less information about other countries than it has about its own. And you know, we all of us economists think in terms of incentives, so you start thinking about the incentives the various players have, and those aren't good. And so I just thought this is kind of like this low-hanging fruit to write about, for me as an academic trying to get promoted to full professor (laughing) – which, by the way, it worked. But also it's really important. I mean, I want freedom, and I totally buy Robert Higgs' view that you can't get much freedom if you have the kind of hyper-kinetic foreign policy we have. And you just have to look. We wouldn't have TSA without 9/11. We wouldn't have taxes as high as they are without our foreign policy. We wouldn't have the NSA surveillance without our foreign policy. And so it's just very hard to get to a small government that treats us really well with this kind of foreign policy.

WOODS: Yeah, now, I wouldn't dispute that, obviously. I agree with that thesis completely. I had Bob Higgs on a long time ago, and I asked him what I'm about to ask you, which is, the governments of the world, though, don't seem to have any shortage of pretexts to wrap the noose around our necks and fasten the shackles to our ankles. So there are countries that have been perfectly peaceful, where they have awful welfare states and suffocating regulations, and they haven't had war as a pretext, and in some cases their taxes are higher than ours. So maybe if we hadn't had war, they would have figured out some other reason to enslave us.

HENDERSON: That's true, and that's a really good point, by the way. I think we're talking probabilities. I think the probability of these things would have been lower without these wars —

WOODS: Yeah.

HENDERSON: — and I also think you have to take account of Americans and who we are. I mean, when I moved to this country from Canada in the early '70s, I saw America as the land of the free. I mean, bit by bit, I've come not to see it that way, and it's not all or nothing. It's the land of the semi-free or the 60% free or whatever. But we have been different in that sense, and it has taken more of a shove to get us to give up our freedoms compared to other countries. We aren't like Europe in that sense, and so I think the shove has been foreign policy.

WOODS: You know, before we go on I want to ask you a completely off-the-wall question. What the heck? It's my show; I want to ask you. It's about a comment you made a long time ago. You might even have forgotten making it, but I sure remembered it, because I thought if I — first I thought, ah, this Henderson, he's flaking out on us. But then I thought about it; you know, any time you think Henderson's flaking out on us, you just think about it for a few days, and you say, well — (laughing). Because you were talking about Fox News, and what you said was, you know, Fox News has — you said something like, Fox News may have its problems, but the fact is Fox News will at least have some of our people on, whereas there's no chance the other networks will have us on. Or CNN thinks Erick Erickson is an alternative, you know?

HENDERSON: Yeah, right.

WOODS: They're so ignorant — or either that or they're sinister — that's what they present to people. And when I thought about it honestly after I got off my high horse, I thought, okay, they do have Judge Napolitano; they have some good people certainly on Fox Business —

HENDERSON: Right.

WOODS: — they've got my friend Michael Malice on a lot, and I've been Fox more than I've been on anything else, and I mean, I used to be obsessed with — ooh, I have a chance to be on TV —

HENDERSON: Right.

WOODS: Now, like, if Fox Business calls me, I live in Topeka, Kansas. I'm not getting on a plane for the size audience they have (laughing). Like, just forget it. But the point is that we do at least have a voice there. But on the other hand – and this goes back to your point in the *Why Peace* anthology – the war issue is so important, and when it comes time for war, Fox News is so downright creepy that I can't decide if that invalidates all the good. So how do you balance that? I'm just curious, because I was so intrigued by that comment of yours.

HENDERSON: Okay, yeah. Actually one of the pieces I'm proud of for having written – I've probably read it five times since it appeared over a decade ago – is a piece on the Lew Rockwell site titled "Two Cheers for Fox News."

WOODS: Maybe that's what it was, yeah, okay.

HENDERSON: Yeah, and the thing was if I were to downgrade it to one and a half (laughing).

WOODS: One and a half cheers, okay (laughing).

HENDERSON: Half of three. And the thing is what I laid out was how they're sometimes good on domestic policy, and then one of the points I made was that O'Reilly has a much higher opinion of his intellect than is justified, and so as a result, and this is not as true anymore; I think he's figured this out. But as a result, he would have people on his show who were very good who were presenting an alternative viewpoint on war, and he thought he could nail them, and he didn't. And so the viewer gets to see this pretty good criticism of the kind of views that O'Reilly and others have, and so that was an unintended consequence of his pompousness, in a sense, that, you know, he thought he was better than he was.

And I remember one in particular – I highlighted it in the piece – was a law professor at the University of Chicago, who wanted the U.S. to be defeated in the Iraq War. And you know, O'Reilly thinks this is horrible, and what about all these people killed, and the guy made clear: wait a minute. I didn't say I wanted people killed. I want the U.S. to be defeated. You can be defeated with no additional deaths. You just leave, or you just say "uncle." It was just beautiful the way the guy laid it out, and O'Reilly had nothing. And so that's some of the little benefit you'll get from Fox. But I've got to say I downgraded it. Except for Stossel, I have to downgrade it to one and a half.

WOODS: Okay, all right, fair enough. Just wondering about that.

HENDERSON: (laughing) Yeah.

WOODS: All right, let's get back to economics and foreign policy. I've read some of the stuff that you've written; I've listened to a talk of yours. So there are certain ideas

that you can bring to bear when it comes to foreign policy that are economic in nature. One of them would have to do with the so-called knowledge issue –

HENDERSON: Yes.

WOODS: – and one would have to do with unintended consequences, although I wonder if these aren't just ordinary commonplaces that aren't the exclusive province of economics.

HENDERSON: Well, you know, the way I've always looked at economics and the way I kind of teach it in my classes is economics is organized common sense.

WOODS: Yeah, good.

HENDERSON: And so the law of demand is very powerful. When the price goes up, quantity demanded falls. It sounds obvious; it is obvious, but what I can show my students is various ways in which people confuse a decrease in quantity demanded with a shift in demand and why that matters. And so once you organize your common sense, you can get further than if you just have these thoughts kind of randomly.

WOODS: All right, show me how you can use these to, let's say, help us to avoid some of the really, really misguided – assuming that we're dealing with people of good will who have simply made innocent mistakes. If we're not dealing with that, then all best are off.

HENDERSON: Okay, so one of the strongest ones, one of the most powerful concepts is the idea of unintended consequences. So think about the Libya war that Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice, and the other one, Cass Sunstein's wife – Samantha Power – that they wanted Obama to get into in Libya, and they said here's this horrible thing happening; we want to save these people. And it was never, okay, so then what, what happens next. And of course, all the things that happened next were pretty bad, and in fact, ISIS I think would not be as powerful as it is without that U.S. intervention in Libya. And so just right there, just think through what happens next.

WOODS: Yeah, and it's funny how utterly incapable so many rank and file Republicans and conservatives are when it comes to this. What did you think the Iraq War was going to do if not strengthen Iran? What is the matter with you?

HENDERSON: (laughing) Yeah, and by the way, it's fun talking about this with my students, who are military officers mainly in the U.S. military, and some light bulbs went on in my class yesterday, by the way. We covered my war for oil article, and it just led to a lot of interesting discussion about this. And yeah, it's just, as you say, it's kind of obvious, but people don't do it. You know what it's like, when you mentioned the conservatives; it's like the way the conservatives talk about the Left when it comes to domestic policy.

WOODS: Right!

HENDERSON: Yeah, they say, oh, let's raise the minimum wage, that'll help all these people. That's what the Left says. And the conservatives say, no, no, the unintended consequence is a higher price; a less skilled worker is going to get priced out of the labor market and be unemployed and have trouble getting on the first rung. And then the Left will respond, yeah, but our intentions are good. Yeah, well, it's the same with foreign policy. Our intentions are good. Samantha Power wanted to help those people in Libya, so let's not judge the action.

WOODS: You know, Walter Block this weekend made a quick sort of glib point about the minimum wage that I had never thought of, that when we think about poorer countries in the world and there's been a lot of desire to send them foreign aid, he says, look, there's no need for foreign aid; just tell them to raise their minimum wage, because apparently it's just that easy. Well likewise, just for the conservatives, it's just that easy: you remove one person; you put another one into power; no problem. I had a great discussion on the removal of Ngo Dinh Diem a few weeks ago on the show by an author who's gone back and looked at it, and we I think all these days say they shouldn't have done that, but that in particular, if you know something about the way the social hierarchy of Vietnamese society works, there the military is not at the high caste end of society. The military is down where we place garbage men. So if you replace somebody like Diem, who was this scholar, and you replace him with a series of military people, this is not good. This is not going to —

HENDERSON: Yeah, yeah.

WOODS: So again, it's this thing where they have this incredibly simplistic response to so many things. And you've given in your writing examples of consequences, like for instance, the interventions in Iran led to consequences 26 years later that we were told, well, that's 26 years later, how could it have anything to do with what we did before.

HENDERSON: Yeah, yeah, and I gave this talk to 47 foreign naval officers at the Naval War College up at Hoover, and I quoted what Carter had said in 1980 at a press conference, when this was thrown in his face when he was dealing with the takeover of the U.S. embassy. And somebody said, well, what about the CIA's successful attempt to unseat Mohammad Mosaddeq back in 1953, and Carter answered, that's ancient history. And I looked at my audience and said, "Who here's taken a course on ancient history?", and they already knew where I was going, and they laughed. I didn't have to give my next line, which was, "Did you ever in ancient history classes talk about stuff that happened 26 years ago?" And it certainly wasn't ancient to them.

WOODS: Right.

HENDERSON: One example I've given in talks is, let's go fast forward from September 11th, 2001 to September 11th, 2028 — so 27 years later. In 2028, do people really think that we'll think of 9/11 as being ancient history? I don't think anyone will.

WOODS: No, that's right. And not to mention, a lot of these people would be the same ones to say one of the motivating factors – now, they're not right about it, but one of the motivating factors behind bin Laden is his desire to avenge the Crusades. Well, the Crusades is a lot more than 26 years ago (laughing).

HENDERSON: Right.

WOODS: (laughing) You know, people have a tendency –

HENDERSON: That is ancient history, right.

WOODS: Yeah, right, I mean, come on now, certainly no one would ever act in response to that. All right, so then, how about this information thing? Is that simply to say – I mean, it's not true that a – well, let's just – the private sector deals with information issues all the time. If you're going to be a chemist, you have to know chemistry. There are certain things you have to know.

HENDERSON: Right.

WOODS: Why is it that people in political office have a knowledge problem, but we don't speak of the knowledge problem in the private sector?

HENDERSON: Yeah, that's a really good point, and I think it's because you need to link knowledge and incentives, information and incentives. So what incentives do they have to get the right information when it's not their own wealth, when it's not the government leaders' own wealth at stake, that it's just their pro rata share of the wealth? And so they just have much weaker incentives than someone who's running a company and it either lives or dies on this next decision. So it's that kind of thing. People make very quick decisions with little thought about information, because they aren't bearing the cost.

WOODS: So what would be an example of that in the history of U.S. foreign policy?

HENDERSON: I can do no better than quote one of the things I quoted in a speech I gave about 10 days ago on this, and it's from David Friedman, Milton Friedman's son, in his book *The Machinery of Freedom*. And he says in order for an interventionist policy to work – here I'm quoting – "It is necessary to correctly figure out which countries are going to be your enemies and which your allies 10 years down the road. If you get it wrong, you find yourself unnecessarily blundering into other people's wars, spending your blood and treasure on their fight instead of theirs and yours. You may, to take an example not entirely at random, get into one war as a result of trying to defend China from Japan, spend the next 30 years trying to defend Japan and Korea and Vietnam from China, then finally discover that the Chinese are your natural allies against the Soviet Union."

WOODS: Yeah, and as a matter of fact, that happened, as it turns out (laughing).

HENDERSON: Right.

WOODS: This is not a hypothetical case.

HENDERSON: Right. And another example I give is the case of the Congo with Patrice Lumumba. When Eisenhower was the president his last year in office, there was all this stuff going on in the Congo, and the information bias that the U.S. government had was they saw everything in terms of the Cold War. So they saw this as some kind of a battle with the Soviet Union, and not really seeing the Congo as it was, which was a couple of hundred mini nations, essentially tribes. And so C. Douglas Dillon, who was Eisenhower's Undersecretary of State, judged Lumumba to be an irrational, almost psychotic personality. And then the question is, why'd he judge that, and Dillon had met with him and said he would never look you in the eye. And Dillon didn't understand that in Africa, looking someone in the eye was a sign of disrespect, and —

WOODS: I learned that from you. That's very interesting.

HENDERSON: Yeah, and so Eisenhower gave the CIA their orders to murder Lumumba, and they didn't, but someone else did, knowing that Eisenhower wanted him out; one of the local factions did. You know, it was catastrophic for the Congo; it wasn't catastrophic for the United States. That's the other thing. A lot of these destructive things don't cause much destruction for us. That's why I think the terrorist threat is the new thing, because now there is this comeback. There is this thing to get back at us, because of various interventions in other countries.

WOODS: What would have to happen for David Henderson to say, all right, look, all the negative consequences that come from war, and I know them as an economist and I know them as a human being, well, they simply pale in comparison to not doing anything? I mean, you must get that, especially in a military school.

HENDERSON: Yeah, but by the way, I don't actually get that very often, and the reason is that I'm talking about scaling back or just ending the U.S. role all over the world, and people in this school and generally in the military and generally in the higher reaches of government so badly want intervention in the rest of the world, that's as far as we ever go. We don't get to, well, okay, what would be the tough one where you would want some kind of military action. And by the way, you ask tough questions (laughing), so let me think about it. I mean, I think that if — here's a tough one, and I'm not happy with this answer —

WOODS: Okay.

HENDERSON: — but I don't know a better answer. Let's say I'm the president of the United States, and we have just incontrovertible evidence that there are 1,000 Russian missiles coming at us and they're going to hit in 20 minutes, and if we don't push the button, you know, well, it's awful. And the thing is, I don't know what I'd do, because if I pushed the button, well, I'll just kill a lot of their people. Already our people are dead.

WOODS: Yeah.

HENDERSON: And so I don't know. I do like the idea of having that nuclear deterrent, but the problem is of course for it to be a real deterrent it has to be credible, which means you have to make it credible that you would push the button. And I'm boxed in on that one. I'm uncomfortable.

WOODS: Well, you know, I could imagine neoconservatives today saying, Henderson, the reason you're in that position and the missiles are coming at you is because you've been a weakling with your noninterventionism all this time, and if only we had put sanctions on Russia and we had tried to eliminate their nuclear program – but the fact is, even the neocons themselves put up with a Russian nuclear program throughout the whole history of communism.

HENDERSON: Right.

WOODS: But it's like now, everything has to be destroyed everywhere seems to be the operating plan.

HENDERSON: Right, right, and by the way, if the United States had not helped Stalin, and there's again, go back to the first intervention, then they would have much less of a good position with nuclear weapons.

WOODS: Oh, and that reminds me. I emailed myself something this morning so I could read it to you. So yeah, subject line, "For Henderson." Oh, and apparently it's empty (laughing). All right, I'll have to – (laughing).

HENDERSON: (laughing)

WOODS: I have nothing for you. (laughing) I have nothing for you.

HENDERSON: I can answer that one (laughing).

WOODS: No, it's just an interesting thing about – look, I grew up in the 1980s, and I was a big Cold Warrior, because, you know, because of the evils of communism and just because I was a rah, rah, Republican, and I loved Ronald Reagan. I loved his plainspoken ways –

HENDERSON: Yeah.

WOODS: I loved "tear down this wall" – I loved the whole thing. I loved the bombing of Libya. Loved the whole thing. But then just recently I've been reading this whole story about this Team B nonsense from the '70s, where you had these neoconservatives who came in and argued that we were woefully underprepared against the Soviets, that it was a huge threat; they bought into, of all people, Paul Samuelson, the leftist economist, who said that the Soviets were going to overtake us in GDP.

HENDERSON: Yeah.

WOODS: The Soviets were going to overtake us in GDP. The neocons went with that because it fed into their narrative of this terrible threat, and so they were inventing things, that the Soviets had such and such kind of submarine system, and experts said no they don't, and the neocons said, well, that just goes to show how clever they are that we have no evidence of it. And it was crazy, and it turns out that basically no claim they made about the strength of the Soviet Union, not one of them turned out to be true. So they were trying to cook the intelligence books even back then. This is not some thing that just occurred all of a sudden when it came to Iraq. This has been going on a long time, even back to what I grew up considering to be the good war, which was the Cold War.

HENDERSON: Yeah, and by the way, one of my friends, one of my good friends was part of Team B, and –

WOODS: Really?

HENDERSON: Yeah, and an older – he's in his eighties now; he was an economist here, kind of mentored me in some ways. And yeah, so that's right. And by the way, Warren Nutter, who was a friend of this guy, this friend – I don't feel like I want to mention his name for some reason, but Warren Nutter was a friend of his, and Warren Nutter at the University of Virginia was the guy in the '50s and '60s who laid out how crappy these Soviet data were and how they really weren't doing very well. And I remember someone referred to the Soviet Union as Upper Volta with missiles.

WOODS: Yeah, yeah, I can't remember – I know that – yeah, yeah.

HENDERSON: Yeah, and so they should have bought their own view of economics, which is that socialism and communism don't work.

WOODS: You know, and I know Richard Pipes was part of – I'm pretty sure he was part of Team B, and the thing is I really like Richard Pipes as a historian. I don't –

HENDERSON: Yeah, yeah.

WOODS: There's nobody I enjoy reading more on the Russian Revolution than Richard Pipes. He's absolutely fantastic. And I got to have dinner with him as an undergraduate, and I was so intimidated (laughing), you know, but yeah, to find out – but let me just say one other thing. A problem that I feel sometimes is that, given that I'm always pointing out, look, this was an inflated threat, that was an inflated threat, or the Saddam Hussein unmanned drone program, which he obviously didn't even have, was an inflated threat – but you know, there's a part of me that fears that because as a libertarian I kind of want these threats to be inflated so I can say, look, the government's making this up and the whole thing's propaganda. You know, I mean, I want to be honest and say my instinct is to look for the government is lying. Now, by

an interesting coincidence, it turns out they have been lying pretty much consistently since they became interventionist –

HENDERSON: Right.

WOODS: – but is there a part of us that ever wonders, how do I know I'm right and that maybe this time Team B might instead be right?

HENDERSON: Well, sure, and so that's why you keep looking for information. I think a good premise is – no, I was going to say a good premise is the government's lying. That's too strong. A good premise is they might be lying. There's a high probability they're lying. But look at their information and really push them and ask what they know and how they know it.

WOODS: Yeah, that's the key thing, I think, is that we have often given them the benefit of the doubt. We think – and people did that with the Iraq War. Well, surely there must be something they know we don't know. And that actually reminds me of back at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where – was it maybe the French ambassador or somebody said, when the U.S. said, look, we've got these satellite photos showing the missile installations, and it might have been the French ambassador who said, look, if the U.S. president tells me they're there, I don't even need to see the photographs.

HENDERSON: Yeah, yeah.

WOODS: Now, probably those photos – I mean, I think that was correct in those days, but then that got brought forward to, well, surely they're not going to lie to us. I mean, they must know, they must have information that we don't have, and people just bought into that. And you think, well, now that they have egg on their faces that won't happen again, but man, that propaganda against Iran, the miracle there is that the war never happened. I'm still shocked that they never got that war.

HENDERSON: No, that's right, and by the way, I think Obama deserves some credit here and so does John Kerry, because that agreement with Iran is not a bad agreement.

WOODS: Yeah, in fact, I –

HENDERSON: Especially compared to what preceded it.

WOODS: Yeah, let me make sure – I had Stephen Walt on the show to talk about the Iran agreement, and I'll link to that at TomWoods.com/668. I'm also going to link to your article about why we don't need wars for oil. And then the journal article you sent me the other night, is that available online, or is that behind a subscription wall?

HENDERSON: It's behind a subscription wall, but I did give a talk locally, and it went up on AntiWar.com yesterday. You can hear the audio where I talk about a lot of these issues we've been talking about.

WOODS: Okay, yeah, I'll link to that. That's the one that I listen to, so yeah, I'll link to that as well. Okay, now, I threw you a lot of curveballs that I wasn't even planning to, but –

HENDERSON: More than I expected, but I enjoyed it (laughing).

WOODS: Yeah, well, I mean, this to me, when I have somebody on that I feel like I can just have a regular conversation with, my bad habit is I take all my notes and I chuck them out the window, and I just start talking. Like that whole Fox News thing was totally uncalled for, but I thought I'm never going to get this chance to ask him this again. So I do want to direct people to these resources, because you'll learn a lot reading David Henderson. They'll all be up at TomWoods.com/668. Thanks for being a good sport about how random everything was, but I thought it was great. Thanks so much.

HENDERSON: Thank you very much, Tom.